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From:
Gregg Heacock <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Assembly for the Teaching of English Grammar <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Tue, 9 Jun 2009 15:57:04 -0400
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Craig & Bob,

I am pleased to see that Lakoff and Johnson's work, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, which lays out a philosophy of language worth our attention.  Besides the discussion of metaphor that Craig has presented well, these writers claim that most communication is unconscious.  We do it naturally without much thought.  Based on this, I asked my ESL students to write the following sentence in the past tense:  This apple tastes delicious.  I was surprised that one student knew right away to say, "That apple tasted delicious."  Just as metaphors are based on scripts that are known unconsciously, the script here is that the present is here and now.  Once the apple is eaten, it becomes that apple because it is no longer here.

As for how we understand how to interpret statements, we seem to scan possibilities to see which meaning is most probable.  I would suggest that, as we see a metaphor, our unconscious process resembles this conscious replication of internal speech:  "Yes, I know these words, but they don't make sense.  So what might they be referring to that I should consider?  Oh, yeah, that makes sense."  It is based on an organization of the mind that begins with experiencing what we have.  The in/out, up/down aspect of our language, which is addressed by Lakoff and Johnson's understanding of the embodied mind, shows that our use of language is grounded in our early physical experience.  This is connected to the past in that we are free spirits born into history.  We take what we have, weighing one thing against another, saying, "Yes, this is so, but what about that?"  The present, that which is pre-sent from the past, is the state in which  we consider how our actions might affect the future.  We focus on doing something and what might result from our actions.  In deciding what is relevant to us, we say, "So, what does this have to do with me, or what does this have to do with that?"  As we take action, we are concerned with what that will make us in the future, our mythic selves in which we incorporate the values we find acceptable:  What will be.  When dealing with these abstractions, we say, "Oh, yeah?  How do you know?  What makes you think so?"  At this level we are concerned with what exists and how often it is so.  These evaluations are constant and unconscious as we evaluate the temperature of the room, how it makes us feel, and what we would like it to be, as we evaluate facial expressions, as we sense danger.  Our analogical sense of amount considers the number of things there are within a certain context; that determines its analogical value.  Three large dogs in one small cage is too much.  Three large dogs in one huge dog park are not many.  Notice that I used the word "much" in the first situation because the context is one of measurement.  I did not realize that when I wrote that sentence.  That realization was unconscious.

Of course, I have mixed some of my ideas with Lakoff's.  But, I think it is important that we consider how we apprehend the world.  If language makes a claim upon the world, it is to say, "This is that," where "this" would be words and "that" would be the world  beyond words.  Grammar is subject to the process of connecting this to that.  In fact, when used properly, it facilitates that process.

I would like to hear what others think of this.

Most sincerely,

Gregg Heacock
---- Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> wrote: 
> Bob,
>    I like the gentle way you start this. I tend to think of Lakoff and
> Johnson's work as something most people on the list would be familiar
> with and I don't want to replace it with my own compressed version. But
> here's how the first chapter opens:
>    "Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and of
> the rhetorical flourish--a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary
> language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of
> language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For
> this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well
> without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is
> persavive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and
> action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think
> and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature."
>    The book is very, very rich with examples, and I think it would be
> worthwhile even for people who might fall short of embracing the views
> expressed in this opening. If nothing else, I think you have to admit
> that metaphor goes under the radar most of the time, is deeply
> pervasive, and often is very revealing of the orientation of the
> speaker. If an argument is being thought of as a "building", for
> example, (with "a foundation", with elements of "construction", as
> something that might be "shaky" or "fall apart" or need "shoring up"),
> that contrasts sharply with someone else who thinks of it as an
> "attack" that you need to "defend against" or a position that might
> need to be "defended". Similarly, we often miss the reality that our
> sensory motor experience of the world gives us concepts like up/down,
> in/out, under/over, before/behind that undergird so much of our more
> abstract thought. "I put you above me."  "She looks down." "I have your
> back". "Hopes are rising." "Don't stick your neck out." "Give me a
> hand." Metaphors like that tend to slip by us though they are a
> constant part of our everyday language world.
>    I have absolutely no idea why your elephant example relates to the
> issue. "in my pajamas" is very literal in either of its
> interpretations. When we have ambiguity in expression, we normally pick
> the one most consistent with our experience of the world. Since
> elephants don't fit in our pajamas (and don't wear them, another
> possibility), we decide at a subconscious level that it means what it
> would normally mean. "I found a spider in my pajamas" would be
> interpreted differently. The joke brings the other possibility into
> conscious play. I see no problem with accounting for ambiguity as a
> cognitive process.
>    You and I are likely to disagree on the more fundamental questions, but
> would it be fair to say that Lakoff and Johnson are a useful read? Do
> you agree that metaphor is often an important conceptual tool, not just
> an expressive one?
> 
> Craig>
> 
>  Sometimes Craig makes assertions that need more support than he provides
> > in his posts.
> >
> >>>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 06/09/09 11:03 AM >>>
> > Susan,
> >    You should read "Metaphors We Live By" (there are other follow up
> > books)if you haven't already. They are a core aspect of language and
> > cognition, well documented, well researched.
> >    If you find my views pointless, it might be better not to respond.
> >
> > *****
> > I have no idea how "core" metaphors are in language.  They don't seem to
> > explain anything about the formal aspects of the tense-aspect system, the
> > basic structure of phrases and clauses, the pronominal system, etc.
> >
> > However, let's consider the following sentence on the bottom of page 1 in
> > Metaphors We Live By.
> >
> > Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in
> > thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what
> > that system is like.
> >
> > ***
> > Pinker, in the Language Instinct, does a good job of suggesting that
> > thinking and the language we use to express those thoughts are necessarily
> > different systems.  Consider the problem of syntactic ambiguity: the basis
> > of this famous joke by Groucho Marx.
> >
> > Last night I shot an elephant in my pajamas.  How it got there, I have no
> > idea.
> >
> > If we take the statement by Lakoff and Johnson seriously, then whenever a
> > person thinks about what they were wearing when they shoot an animal is
> > necessarily confusable with where the animal was.  Really? A person can't
> > keep those two ideas separate.
> >
> > Of course, if we have to translate our thoughts to a formal system, the
> > ambiguity that is the basis of Marx's joke makes sense.
> >
> > Bob Yates, University of Central Missouri
> >
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> >
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