Bruce,
I want to say first of all that I was drafting this when Bill's post
came in. So it tends in that direction without acknowledging it. Instead
of starting over, I'll send it on and pick up on the conversation later.
I'm also way behind in writing an article for deadline, so I may have to
drop off without wanting to.
I like the idea of a semantic net (or nets) and the details around
that. That seems like a very rich approach.
The coding of decisions might be coding of rhetorical options, not
just formal ones. So the decision to make a question rather than
statement would then lead to decisions about how to focus the question
and so on. My point would be that it might make more sense to think of
decisions as motivated, not just constrained.
The question might also be whether the mind itself works like a
computer works. The computer, for example, is a serially processing
system, and other models of mind see it as more like a parallel
processing system. It may be that decisions about interpersonal meaning
and decisions about representing the world and decisions about the
production of text are all firing simultaneously and the clause itself
is therefore multi-functional, with different kinds of feedback loops,
different kinds of options in one area closing off options in another,
and so on. Language in the real world would have to do this, I suspect,
for it to work as a language.
Computers don't do anything like real language as far as I can see,
and they seem to have no way of knowing what anyone is saying. They have
never lived a human life, and they have no human reference to draw on. I
don't think we can be sure that a computer is an ideal model for human
language. It never has purposes unless externally programmed in.
When we look at actual language use, we can use terms like
"frequency." We can look at co-occurrence of syntactic forms and make
observations about that, as Biber has done. We can test human cognition
in a number of ways in controlled experiments, as the cognitive
linguists and cognitive psychologists are doing. We can look closely at
language acquisition to give us clues to how it happens and what
conditions best help it along. All of this is science.
I admit I am biased toward a certain orientation toward language,
toward what Coleridge called "organic form", the notion that form and
meaning are inextricably linked. Other people may have a more mechanical
view, but my experience has been that good writing rarely comes out of
that. To put that down to a pedestrian level, a student who is told that
a paragraph has to have between three and five sentences (much more
common than you would expect) has been done serious damage. I don't
suspect you would advocate anything like that, but there is damage done
by people who believe form is unimportant, or that menaing is simply
poured into it. I am much more interested in those areas you want to
pass off as "ineffable." In fact, they may be much more effable than you
suspect.
Craig
Bruce Despain wrote:
> Craig,
>
> You seem to have missed my point about rules again.
>
> When you talk about choice, you seem to forget that the heart of
> computer systems is the encoding of decisions in binary codes
> (true/false). We need to avoid confusion between the purposes of
> generative grammar and the purposes of generative rules. We don't
> want to throw out binary codes - the formal constructs - because we
> don't like what they encode. The theoretical goal ought to be the
> formalization of choice. We need clarity in the formal objects.
>
> Any decent grammar ought to have a place for meaning, "natural" or
> not. How does a grammar account for what it finds? An accounting
> probably involves numbers, measures, the technologies used by
> science. I believe that there are structures in the brain for
> language processing (Brocca's area, Wernicke's area, etc.) It is
> mysterious how they get to be there. It is just as mysterious how the
> 19 regions for processing visual information got there. No doubt they
> will be found encoded in the DNA, I suppose. But it is irrefutable
> that there are structures that process language. It is an undecided
> question to what extent the grammar reflects these structures. I hope
> that this is not a point at issue.
>
> My hope would be that a "semantically leaning" theory would tell us
> how to encode the semantics involved. Social and personal
> interactions are certainly an influence on how the world ought to be
> encoded. Perhaps "field, tenor, and mode" are good approximations to
> classes of meaning, but they are still meaning. They are attempts to
> make generalizations about utterances in their extra-linguistic
> contexts.
>
> A specific "Genre," as I suppose, isolates utterances to those having
> a specific purpose. It also considers other aspects of culture
> besides language, such as religion, technology, kinship relations. And
> because language (as part of culture) changes through time, the genre
> must be defined in these terms as well. Being aware of the influence
> of these elements on the use of language is crucial to writing well. I
> would not call this a "deeper understanding of language," however.
> Formalizing these elements as part of linguistic science is no
> different than formalizing any other semantic field. I would think
> that they themselves need to be formally modeled before their formal
> effect on grammatical structures can be explicated. Until that is
> done they remain as interesting observations about language use. (We
> may know that the sounds of language change, but we don't have the
> tools to describe Grimm's law, or the data to describe Verner's law.
> It is one thing to be aware of a phenomenon, another to describe it
> within the formal constraints of science.) It is one thing to ask
> questions about McDonald's ads, it is another to describe the
> phenomenon observed. You will be doing a good work to generalize about
> these observations. Maybe such empirical laws as are thus developed
> can be fit into some formal theory someday, but I don't think
> functionalism fills that bill.
>
> My stance on grammar arising from the structure of the world is
> informed strongly by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There is much of the
> opposite going on as the world and the cultures built by man within it
> change. There are forces for change in both directions. Our
> experience tells us that there seem to be few limits to what a good
> writer can express. However, in the end I am willing to admit the
> existence of ineffible concepts. We admire the creative ability of
> poets in attempting to clothe such concepts with shape and size.
> Often the "rules of grammar" are wrested in doing so. But it is the
> "rules of formal systems" that allow us to account for how it is
> done. Such rules tell us how to describe the semantics of a language
> -- the world view. The formal semantics are influenced (manipulated)
> by the "rules of grammar."
>
> I am presently enjoying the study of semantic nets. This formal
> construct is related directly to formal logic, but is equally
> influenced by the syntax and morphology of the language being modeled.
> In this study (Herman Helbig's MultiNet) a situation expressed in
> "Sally gave Mary a ball" would be translated to a number of primitive
> objects and relations. Some of them, e.g., Benefactive, which
> describes Mary's involvement in the situation, are "C-Roles" (cf.
> theta roles) dictated by English and similar languages. Prototypical
> knowledge guides inferences (rules of logic) that can come from the
> normal interpretation of this expression. Categorical knowledge tells
> us that a "ball" belongs to that class of concrete objects that have a
> spheroid shape. Situational knowledge tells us about the individual
> persons and objects instantiated by the situation. All of these kinds
> of knowledge are modeled as parts and attributes of parts of the
> semantic net.
>
> The problem with limiting the term language to a particular language
> is mirrored by the differences between a grammar of a language and the
> syntax of a language. "Grammar rules" brings up the idea of the
> limited area of syntactic patterns and regularities. These live and
> breath, but not as much perhaps as the rules of other parts of the
> grammar, particularly those of semantics. "Formal grammar" needs to
> include all levels and modules displaying linguistic phenomena.
>
> I believe that at least an awareness of this vast field and its
> specializations can be very helpful to courses in language use. This
> should not involve the dissing of formalizations in general. We
> should be willing to view language as multi-faceted, but still
> analyzable with the scientific approach. I believe that the many
> facets of language reflect the organization of the brain into modules:
> semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology, even orthography (writing
> systems) -- the traditional breakdonwn. But this philosophy should
> not distract from the scientific goal of formalizing the description
> of what we observe in language, wherever we find it.
>
> Bruce
>
> >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/17/07 8:32 AM >>>
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>
> Bruce,
>
> Those are very complex questions, and I=E2=80=99m wondering about a way=
> to=20
> phrase all this so it might be of use to the group as a whole.
>
> I don=E2=80=99t have Halliday=E2=80=99s Intro to functional grammar wi=
> th me here at=20
> work, and I=E2=80=99ll consult it later, but I seem to remember him sayin=
> g that=20
> there is a computerized version of the grammar which works this out in=20
> great detail as a system of choices. Systemic functional grammar is=20
> systemic, and it is a grammar. It is a =E2=80=9Cnatural=E2=80=9D grammar,=
> meaning that=20
> it attempts to account for the grammar that it finds. It is=20
> =E2=80=9Csemantically leaning=E2=80=9D. I think, though please correct me=
> if I=E2=80=99m wrong,=20
> that generative grammar is more biologically leaning, looking to=20
> describe the rules for the generation of forms. A functional grammar=20
> looks at grammar from the perspective of meaning, and it thinks of=20
> meaning as multi-functional, as including, not just a representation of=20
> the world, but interaction and the production of text. It also broadens=20
> out to field, tenor, and mode, which have definitions that I won=E2=80=99=
> t trust=20
> to memory. Mode includes =E2=80=9Cgenre=E2=80=9D. A good deal of pedagogi=
> cal interest=20
> these days is in genre as a center of concern. =E2=80=9CGenre=E2=80=9D is=
> looked at as=20
> something purposeful, culturally formed, dynamic, staged (not just a=20
> single stage). It is wide enough to include things like marriage=20
> proposals along with lab reports or academic arguments. So it is
> typical=20
> in a classroom in England or Australia to have students examine=20
> advertisements and make observations about the kind of language that=20
> shows up and the way it is used, then construct advertisements of their=20
> own. Advertisement is a genre and it may have sub-genres. If we extend=20
> this genre focus out, it can give us a way to directly link both
> reading=20
> and writing to a deeper understanding of language and how it works in=20
> the real world. The theoretical position would be that the forms of=20
> language are responsive to context. I am currently working this out in
> a=20
> Reading Literature class, starting with the notion of story and how it=20
> works. How is orientation built in? How does a story writer handle=20
> point-of-view (which is a technical term in literature)? I can find key=20
> paragraphs and bring that right down to the level of the sentence. If=20
> McDonald=E2=80=99s is now running a campaign around =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=99m =
> loving it=E2=80=9D, why is that=20
> effective? Is the word =E2=80=9Clove=E2=80=9D usually used that way? How=
> does present=20
> progressive, in this case, connect with the desire to sell hamburgers?
>
> Here=E2=80=99s where we might differ in theoretical perspective. You =
> say the=20
> following:
>
> =E2=80=9CThe utterance dimensions are quite different from the semantic=20
> structure. The semantics has been abstracted, and manipulated by=20
> language, to be represented in the utterance.=E2=80=9D
>
> I admit I=E2=80=99m not quite sure what that means or how it works ou=
> t in=20
> practice. But because of my current reading in cognitive linguistics
> and=20
> in usage based approaches, I don=E2=80=99t think of grammar =E2=80=9Crule=
> s=E2=80=9D (syntax=20
> rules) as having an autonomous existence that then drives discourse. It=20
> may be better to think of grammar =E2=80=9Crules=E2=80=9D as patterns tha=
> t arise from=20
> our being in the world. We can=E2=80=99t understand language without=20
> understanding the nature of cognition. The mind, as Lakoff keeps
> saying,=20
> is deeply =E2=80=9Cembodied=E2=80=9D, and language itself is deeply influ=
> enced by our=20
> sensory motor experience of the world. And we can't understand language=20
> without thinking of it as having a social dimension. It is not an=20
> objective world, but a deeply human world that we experience through=20
> language.
>
> Here=E2=80=99s another take on it from the perspective of Adele Goldberg=
> , as=20
> summarized by Croft and Cruse (Cognitive Linguistics, Cambridge 2004):=20
> =E2=80=9Cthe complex event or situation is treated as the primitive unit =
> of=20
> semantic representation, and the definitions of the roles in the event=20
> are derived from the situation as a whole.=E2=80=9D As I understand this=
> , this=20
> means that di-transitive constructions (for example, =E2=80=9CSally gave =
> Mary a=20
> ball=E2=80=9D) arise from the nature of the processes, in this case givin=
> g, not=20
> from an abstract set of =E2=80=9Crules=E2=80=9D. She has sub-categories =
> of=20
> ditransitivity, which differ from each other because of the nature of=20
> the processes involved. But =E2=80=9Cgiving=E2=80=9D is the
> prototype.(=E2=
> =80=9CPrototype=E2=80=9D is an=20
> important part of cognitive theory, which grounds meaning in a study of=20
> how the mind works. Prototypes are very important for our understanding=20
> of categories.) Other ditransitive constructions can be thought of as=20
> =E2=80=9Cextensions of the prototype.=E2=80=9D
>
> As you can see, this changes radically the notion of
> =E2=80=9Crules=E2=
> =80=9D and=20
> their role in discourse. It looks at rules as growing out of language=20
> use, not as separate from it. These are more like patterns. And any=20
> attempt to reduce language down to abstractions from these patterns may=20
> give us a false impression of how language works and take us away from=20
> the living, dynamic language, not closer to it.=20
>
> =E2=80=9CConstructions=E2=80=9D are themselves meaningful, not merel=
> y conveyors of=20
> meaning.
>
> From this perspective, too, grammar is learned, not merely=20
> activated. In fact, work is being done to study childhood language=20
> acquisition from this perspective, and it seems to hold up very well in=20
> practice.
>
> Implications for us? There may be good reasons why =E2=80=9Cformal gra=
> mmar=E2=80=99=20
> does not carry over to writing. But at the same time, we may be able to=20
> make a great case for the importance of individuals being mentored into=20
> language, a great case for language acquisition as a life-long process,=20
> a great case for attention to language as deeply tied to the goals of=20
> literacy, including reading and writing.
>
> Craig
>
>
>
> Bruce D. Despain wrote:
> > Craig,
> >
> > You will probably see that our positions on functionality are not
> that=20
> > different. The approach is just different. The imaginary context=20
> > itself has a structure -- a semantic structure that stretches across=20
> > several dimensions. What we utter has to reside in a string -- just=20
> > one dimension in time that has a dimension of sound that is analyzed=20
> > into multiple dimensions. The utterance dimensions are quite=20
> > different from the semantic structure. The semantics has been=20
> > abstracted, and manipulated by language, to be represented in the=20
> > utterance. There is a lot missing; there is a lot filled in. I am=20
> > looking for a set of functions in the mathematical sense that can use=20
> > the semantic fields (planes, layers, dimensions) as its domain and
> map=20
> > their values onto a range in the linguistic planes of syntax,=20
> > morphology, phonology, orthographics. Would you claim there to be a=20
> > linguistic plane of "functional" elements that these semantics get=20
> > mapped to? Or would it be better to say that these elements are a=20
> > part of the semantics and remain there only to be discerned after the=20
> > linguistic elements have been displayed to the mind?
> >
> > The "functional" layer, maybe, is a filtering of the already complex=20
> > clumping of semantic elements. What is its nature? Perhaps it=20
> > doesn't work with elements at all. But science needs an analysis
> into=20
> > parts. Can the context of an utterance be described in terms other=20
> > than the terms that describe the rest of the semantic layers? I=20
> > wonder if maybe it is "simply" another way of dividing up the layers=20
> > of a semantic analysis. The example I gave from Bolinger was meant
> to=20
> > demonstrate just what you were saying about the ubiquitous clumping
> of=20
> > semantic elements in the language (English) idiom. We could say it
> is=20
> > "functional" or we could say it is a "hidden" part of the semantics =20
> > -- the semantics of an "extra-linguistic" context -- one that could=20
> > be coded in language, if we chose to. The semantics begs for=20
> > description (some scientists have used rules of the form used in
> logic=20
> > and mathematics) and I simply think that the "functional" does too.
> >
> > Bruce
> >
> > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Hancock" <[log in to unmask]>
> > To: <[log in to unmask]>
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 8:29 AM
> > Subject: Re: Rules was Those old transitivity blues
> >
> >
> >> Bruce,
> >> Thanks for the warm words. I do think this is a good faith=20
> >> conversation, and I'll try to keep on in that tone.
> >> We certainly do need context to understand a great deal of=20
> >> discourse, and I'm not sure why you would present that as an
> argument=20
> >> against the functional. "How cold does it have to get" could mean=20
> >> many things, and the only way it can include the idea of shutting a=20
> >> window is to put it into an imaginary context. A functional approach=20
> >> is not going to say that we can infer context from a form, but the=20
> >> opposite--that we need context, and that the formal structures we=20
> >> utter are context sensitive. "How cold does it have to get" makes no=20
> >> sense out of context, so we infer a context for it. I would see it
> as=20
> >> what usage based construction grammar calls a "schema", a form=20
> >> meaning pairing unpredicted by the general rules of a formal syntax=20
> >> and one that has blanks to fill in. "How much snow has to pile up=20
> >> before you shovel it?" "How much does the garbage have to stink=20
> >> before you take it out?" "How many examples do I have to give before=20
> >> a concept comes through?" The schema brings with it a kind of=20
> >> sarcasm or rudeness that is part of its meaning. Rudeness is part of=20
> >> the schema.
> >> "Schema" are one of the patterns cognitive linguists use to argue=20
> >> against the innateness of grammar. They are clearly learned, clearly=20
> >> language dependent (and not universal.) If we can learn schema=20
> >> rapidly and easily, we have evidence of the ability to learn other=20
> >> patterns.
> >> Many grammatical constructions become lexicalized and then pick up=20
> >> meanings somewhat unpredictable from their parts. Any approach to=20
> >> grammar will have to accommodate that. Any theory of language should=20
> >> accomodate the fact that grammatical constructions are constantly=20
> >> coming into being.
> >> Dividing subject function up into grammatical subject, actor, and=20
> >> theme is not at all ambiguous. My experience, in fact, is that much=20
> >> of the confusion about subject in most students' minds comes from=20
> >> believing that a subject is the first thing and the actor and the=20
> >> focus of the proposition; so when those separate functions are=20
> >> acknowledged, they have an easier time--a much easier time--with the=20
> >> concept. It is a way of making the notion of "subject" more precise.=20
> >> Traditional grammar tries to pass it off as innate or intuitive,
> when=20
> >> the intuitions are quite fuzzy. Tag questions work because they
> allow=20
> >> us to isolate the grammatical subject from other competing=20
> >> possibilities, such as coming first or doing the deed. A deeper=20
> >> understanding of what we mean by subject carries over into reading=20
> >> and writing in a very useful way. We have a way of understanding why=20
> >> a writer might choose one form over the other within the flow of=20
> >> discourse.
> >> The desire for a one-to-one mapping between structure and function=20
> >> may be a desire for neat and clean categories in a world where those=20
> >> are rare. Does the category "hammer" include sledge hammer? How
> about=20
> >> a rubber mallet? Is a nail gun a kind of hammer? In what ways is it
> a=20
> >> gun? If we look closely at the cognitive nature of categories, we=20
> >> find that many categories have elements that have only loose family=20
> >> relationships with each other. Some elements of the category seem=20
> >> more central than others. When I think hammer, I think claw hammer.
> A=20
> >> nail gun has a trigger and shoots things, but so does a hose nozzle.=20
> >> If we look back from the functional end, we can see something like=20
> >> "hammering in nails" as a function that can be performed in at least=20
> >> two ways, one of them invented fairly recently. I use my screw
> driver=20
> >> to open paint cans, and I have seen my wife use one to loosen soil.=20
> >> The other day, I used one to pry open a stuck window.
> >> And a hammer, of course, has a form that fits its function. It's=20
> >> not that we had them lying around and then decided to hammer nails=20
> >> with them, but the need to have something to hammer nails has=20
> >> influenced the development of the hammer (and now the nail gun.)=20
> >> Anyone who hammers as awkwardly as I do knows what the claw is for.=20
> >> Mallets are good for pounding. The analogy may or may not carry over=20
> >> to language, but from a functional perspective, the belief is that
> it=20
> >> does. Form and function are deeply connected.
> >>
> >> Craig
> >>
> >> Bruce Despain wrote:
> >>> Craig,
> >>> I'm sorry for the disagreement, but I don't think it is as serious=20
> >>> as you make it out to be. Maybe I made some of my positions out to=20
> >>> be stronger than they actually are. However, that said, there are
> a=20
> >>> few comments I would still like to make about your position. What I=20
> >>> hope for with the word "function" is that the mathematical sense or=20
> >>> formal definition can be made to work with the less formal=20
> >>> meanings. What I mean is that "function" ought to be formalized,=20
> >>> even from the general metaphorical uses it has. This is not about=20
> >>> the word but about the goal of a scientific approach. As the=20
> >>> designation of a role, the word ought to refer to something that
> can=20
> >>> be defined in less vague terms, elements with more basic meaning. =20
> >>> (You should be very cautious about your quotes. There is a world of=20
> >>> difference between a /function/ and "function.") I would like to=20
> >>> think that "role" can be defined as a mathematical /relation/,
> which=20
> >>> is like a /function/ but has values that range over "true" and=20
> >>> "false" rather than numbers or points on a cline. A subject is one=20
> >>> of your ambiguous relations: logical subject, grammatical subject.
> I=20
> >>> think that the tools of linguistics need to be scientifically=20
> >>> qualified. GT grammar has to concentrate on the syntactic aspects=20
> >>> of grammatical analysis. If that is not enough, if it ignores=20
> >>> spelling, if it ignores aspects of meaning, if it ignores word=20
> >>> structure, maybe it's time to to develop a formal approach that
> will=20
> >>> describe these other aspects of language. What I hate is to take a=20
> >>> tool, like an ax, emphasize its function, find it being used as a=20
> >>> hammer, and then claim that these are two aspects of the same
> tool. =20
> >>> It's much better, I think, to point out the structural similarities=20
> >>> between a hammer and an ax, and point out how these make it
> possible=20
> >>> for them to exchange roles for certain jobs. Your example of the
> use=20
> >>> of "it" as a place holder for the subject of a passive: I would be=20
> >>> very suspect of any syntactic theory that made it "superfluous."
> If=20
> >>> the semantics of the sentence are being described without it,=20
> >>> elements at a higher syntactic level, e.g., the declarative=20
> >>> sentence, would still have to be demonstrated to be accepted as=20
> >>> grammatical, elements which without it could not exist. In my=20
> >>> example from a previous post the "shut the window" was an essential=20
> >>> part of the meaning of "How cold does it have to get?" The=20
> >>> extralinguistic context contributed the imperative portion by=20
> >>> supplying "before you shut the window." In this sense, a=20
> >>> superfluous element is not one that does not belong to the theory,=20
> >>> just one that it doesn't have to be uttered to be understood. To=20
> >>> use an example from Bollinger: a lawyer advises a debtor that he=20
> >>> doesn't need to pay a particular bill because "the statute of=20
> >>> limitations has expired on that bill." He does not mean that the=20
> >>> statute is no longer in force, but that the period of time
> specified=20
> >>> in that statute for a bill of that kind has expired. The desire to=20
> >>> use words in this kind of "non-superfluous" way is omnipresent in=20
> >>> language, especially poetry. It keeps the language mavins and=20
> >>> critics of language use very busy. It comes when we ignore the=20
> >>> original intent of the ax and change its functionality to a
> hammer. =20
> >>> It may be illogical but we take advantage of the structure we have=20
> >>> for a different use. This is called "exaption" in evolutionary=20
> >>> biology. I don't mind the fact that we disagree. I highly respect=20
> >>> your experience and skills at teaching English writing. I've always=20
> >>> admired a good writer and hope someday to do better at explaining
> my=20
> >>> own ideas and understandings. This is, I hope, a good forum for=20
> >>> doing so. Bruce
> >>>
> >>> >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/15/07 5:46 AM >>>
> >>> Bruce,
> >>> The term "function" seems to have a long, venerable history in
> >>> linguistics. The OED cites both Bloomfield and C. C. Fries. Halliday
> >>> tends to use the term much as many of us use it on list. We can put
> >>> words or constructions roughly into classes, which tell us something
> >>> about the meaning potential of the word or structure. The word
> >>> "function" designates the role of the word or word group within a
> >>> particular instance of use. In the previous sentence, "The word
> >>> function" is noun phrase acting as subject. (It also acts us agent of
> >>> "designates". And it is unmarked theme in the theme/rheme structure o=
> f
> >>> the clause.) It is not uncommon for a structure to have more than one
> >>> function.
> >>> I don't think it is accurate to say that the functionalists
> don't=20
> >>> use
> >>> the tools of linguistics. The primary difference is that they see
> >>> language as innately functional, not just a formal system that can th=
> en
> >>> be put to use in functional ways. Generative grammar is often
> >>> criticized from the functional side for calling everything that doesn=
> 't
> >>> fit neatly into its theory peripheral or unimportant. It becomes so
> >>> abstract that it no longer seems to represent what many of us think o=
> f
> >>> as language.
> >>> There may in fact be many cases in which the passive is more prima=
> ry
> >>> than the active. There is no doubt a good reason why (according to
> >>> Biber et al) passives are eight times more likely to show up in
> >>> academic discourse. From a functional perpsective, active and passive
> >>> give us alternative choices, and each gives us a different meaning.
> >>> Someone asks "Who gave the book to Charlie?" You may likely
> reply=20
> >>> "It
> >>> was given by his wife." This allows us to put given information ("It"=
> )
> >>> first and new information in clause ending prominence. Whether or not
> >>> this is thought of as superfluous is a theoretical position, not a
> >>> scientific one. I find myself much more attracted to the theory that
> >>> explores how these structures function in the world. If we theorize
> >>> about them out of context, we may end up with a distorted theory.
> >>> At some point, of course, we need to agree to disagree. I am a=20
> >>> writer
> >>> and writing teacher and somewhat a learning specialist by position an=
> d
> >>> you are a mathematician, so that may explain a great detail. I like
> >>> math and always did well in it, but I do not think it is a good model
> >>> for the complexities of language. And I think it is misleading to cal=
> l
> >>> any approaches that aren't mathematical less rigorous or scientific.
> >>>
> >>> Craig
> >>>
> >>> Craig,
> >>> >
> >>> > I think my concern is really quite far from the classroom, for=20
> >>> which I
> >>> > apologize. It's more like a paleontologist using the tools of
> >>> geology to
> >>> > solve biological questions. I think the functionalists need to=20
> >>> use > some
> >>> > more tools of linguistics to solve their language questions. I=20
> >>> see no
> >>> > sense debating the cline of polite requests, whether the points are
> >>> > continuous of discontinuous, or adjusted up or down by context, if
> >>> we have
> >>> > no way to measure where the points are. Wouldn't it be helpful
> to=20
> >>> have
> >>> > measures? Technology can help science to collect and analyze their
> >>> data.
> >>> > The theory can only take us so far. What? It might be refuted
> if=20
> >>> its
> >>> > predictions cannot be corroborated. My point in segmenting the
> >>> > differently formulated requests was show the direction toward =20
> >>> some > kind
> >>> > of measure. This is not just by tallying up the units of meaning b=
> ut
> >>> > would involve weighing them in context. Let's callibrate the=20
> >>> cline and
> >>> > establish points or regions along it. I don't think the=20
> >>> instruments > for
> >>> > doing such a thing are developed. Like a paleontologist we're just
> >>> > waiting for the next discovery.
> >>> >
> >>> > If the theory helps to teach the concepts that need teaching,
> more=20
> >>> > power
> >>> > to it. Some models are helpful, but others can be disruptive in th=
> e
> >>> > acquisition of a skill. I think of the power that certain images
> >>> have in
> >>> > teaching music and voice. Educators have learned that certain visu=
> al
> >>> > metaphors guide the mind in some mysterious way to produce or=20
> >>> reproduce
> >>> > the sounds desired. I sure wish I knew what the rules were
> behind=20
> >>> > these
> >>> > secrets (in the brain, in the mind).
> >>> >
> >>> > Bruce
> >>> >
> >>> >>>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/12/07 1:59 PM >>>
> >>> >
> >>> > Bruce,
> >>> > I'll check out definitions for "functional" in Halliday and=20
> >>> get > back
> >>> > to you. I admit I'm not using the term as a mathematician >=20
> >>> would--perhaps
> >>> > more like a biologist, as in "what is the function of the placenta
> >>> > within the reproductive system." I don't think mathematical
> models=20
> >>> work
> >>> > well for language--once you strip it of its semantic and discourse
> >>> > content and context, you end up with a view of language that=20
> >>> doesn't > fit
> >>> > what we find in the world. I don't think an ecology is less=20
> >>> scientific
> >>> > than classical biology. It just has a different (systemic and
> >>> > functional) orientation. It asks a different set of questions,=20
> >>> ones > that
> >>> > may yet save the world.
> >>> > Ordering or requesting politely might be thought of as different
> >>> > points on a cline. One is not necessarily more primary than the=20
> >>> other,
> >>> > and the words of politeness won't be superfluous to the human=20
> >>> relations
> >>> > we are fostering though language. The same would be true of passive=
> s.
> >>> > You can certainly say that the unmarked or default is the active, b=
> ut
> >>> > they do not mean the same thing if you include things like >=20
> >>> propositional
> >>> > focus or textual unity within your definition of meaning. In the
> >>> > language of cognitive linguistics, different versions will=20
> >>> construe the
> >>> > world differently. In functional grammar, grammatical subject is a
> >>> > separate function from actor or agent, though they generally=20
> >>> co-occur.
> >>> > When we vary from that co-occurrence, we are simply predicating a
> >>> > statement about another element. One is not necessarily more primar=
> y,
> >>> > and the extra words are not superfluous, but highly functional.
> >>> > I don't mean to imply that generative grammar presents rules as
> >>> > regulative. I do think most people believe grammar rules are
> rules=20
> >>> that
> >>> > you are supposed to follow, not just patterns that arise from >=20
> >>> purposeful
> >>> > use of language. And when we abstract these rules from context,
> we=20
> >>> pull
> >>> > further and further away from the living language. If we use the te=
> rm
> >>> > "pattern", perhaps we could change that.
> >>> > I think it might be fine to teach generative grammar in the=20
> >>> schools
> >>> > as a discipline of inquiry, but I don't think it will help us=20
> >>> develop a
> >>> > view of language that will carry over into reading and writing. I
> >>> > believe both functional and cognitive approaches have much more=20
> >>> promise
> >>> > for that.
> >>> >
> >>> > Craig
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Bruce Despain wrote:
> >>> >> Craig,
> >>> >>
> >>> >> With my experience in math, I have a difficulty with the word
> >>> >> "function" similarly as you do with "rule." For the=20
> >>> mathematician the
> >>> >> function is a process that has a domain or set of input values=20
> >>> (one or
> >>> >> more parameters) and a range or output value. The
> transformation=20
> >>> is a
> >>> >> mapping or relation (one to one, one to many, many to one) of
> one=20
> >>> set
> >>> >> of values onto another. This way of picturing the relationship as=
> a
> >>> >> process is a convenience for understanding the model. In this way
> >>> >> rules and patterns are simply two ways of viewing the same
> >>> >> phenomena. The rules as functions output a value, which can=20
> >>> often be
> >>> >> considered a pattern. It is the analysis of patterns that allow=20
> >>> us to
> >>> >> describe them by rule. Generative rules (now called Backus-Naur
> >>> >> form) were developed with this in mind. Rules in this sense are n=
> ot
> >>> >> regulative, except to the person who wants a description of the
> >>> >> structure. They show how to go about building it so as to get the
> >>> >> best results. (The are not generative either, in the sense of=20
> >>> giving
> >>> >> birth to ideas.)
> >>> >>
> >>> >> To beat a dead horse: the normal way to request behavior of anothe=
> r
> >>> >> person is with an imperative ("Shut the window"), but we can use t=
> he
> >>> >> yes-no interrogative to inquire about a person's disposition to=20
> >>> behave
> >>> >> in a certain way: "Will you shut the window?" or a declarative "It=
> 's
> >>> >> cold in here" or even a wh-interrogative, "How cold does it have t=
> o
> >>> >> get?" If the syntactic description of the sentence is limited to=20
> >>> such
> >>> >> sentence types, it is easy to see that Halladay needed another lev=
> el
> >>> >> (meta-) on which to express the actual intent of the question apar=
> t
> >>> >> from its form. Hence, at this level (interactive) the three=20
> >>> sentences
> >>> >> that are used for the same purpose are of the same type.
> >>> >> If we subscribe to the compositionality of language meaning, there
> >>> >> would certainly be more elementary units of meaning of which the=20
> >>> more
> >>> >> complex constructions are composed. Couldn't these be considered
> >>> >> primary? If it takes me more words (syntactically) to say somethi=
> ng
> >>> >> one way, perhaps that would be a rough indication of the number of
> >>> >> meaning elements it could be broken down into. The active sentenc=
> e
> >>> >> usually has one less word than the passive, which uses a form of=20
> >>> "be"
> >>> >> with the passive participle. If we're counting morphemes, we woul=
> d
> >>> >> have to consider the participle ending as another element. The
> >>> >> passive seems to be less primary from an analytic point of
> view. =20
> >>> The
> >>> >> same argument makes sentences with a progressive aspect less prima=
> ry
> >>> >> than corresponding ones with a simple finite verb. They are
> >>> >> structurally more complex and seem also to contain additional
> >>> >> meaningful units. Perhaps if we are allowed to cut away the
> >>> >> superfluous content of the above syntactically different=20
> >>> sentences, we
> >>> >> can be left with a core set of meanings at the interactive level. =
> A
> >>> >> transformation would seem to be an appropriate model for stating=20
> >>> such
> >>> >> a relationship.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> My intent was to make a point that has less to do with pedagogy,
> >>> >> perhaps, than formal models. Yet, we must admit that kids today=20
> >>> have
> >>> >> been given the opportunity to learn a good deal of these concepts =
> in
> >>> >> their math classes. Maybe pedagogy needs to relate to this kind
> >>> >> of educational curriculum to some extent. Many branches of
> >>> >> linguistics are trying to bridge this abysmal gap between the
> >>> >> humanities and science. I think some of it ought to trickle down =
> to
> >>> >> the lower grades. Maybe we should teach using the mathematical
> >>> >> approach to functions and rules. If not literally, perhaps only
> >>> >> metaphorically.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Bruce
> >>> >>
> >>> >> >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/11/07 9:40 AM >>>
> >>> >> Bruce,
> >>> >> It may be hard to use the term "transformation" without=20
> >>> bringing in
> >>> >> all the apparatus that has historically come with it. It may be=20
> >>> better
> >>> >> to talk about alternative options, perhaps ones that complement ea=
> ch
> >>> >> other and stand at more or less equal status. So a question is not=
> a
> >>> >> transformed statement, but just an alternative choice--offering
> >>> >> information or requesting information as both necessary options=20
> >>> in the
> >>> >> system. We can also request or offer goods and services, and we ha=
> ve
> >>> >> ways to carry that out.
> >>> >> Halliday describes three different metafunctions, one being
> >>> >> interpersonal and interactive, another being representational,=20
> >>> and the
> >>> >> other being largely textual. So you might say that a passive=20
> >>> sentence
> >>> >> has been "transformed" from an active one, but a functional analys=
> is
> >>> >> would emphasize that a different entity has been moved into >>=20
> >>> grammatical
> >>> >> subject role to ground the proposition, while the role of doer
> of=20
> >>> the
> >>> >> action (representation) has been left out or shifted into the
> >>> >> predicate.
> >>> >> This may happen for textual reasons, perhaps to keep a topic in
> >>> >> extended
> >>> >> focus. If you treat this systematically, then one is not a
> >>> >> transformation of the other, just ways to accommodate different
> >>> >> functions within the structure of the clause. It may be=20
> >>> misleading to
> >>> >> think of one as more primary than the other, even if more common.
> >>> >> We can certainly divide verbs into physical (material) and ment=
> al
> >>> >> (cognitive), and we do mix those types up in a sort of metaphor=20
> >>> all >> the
> >>> >> time. When the wind "howls", we are granting it a speech act. When=
> I
> >>> >> "fall" for someone, I'm describing emotional change in physical=20
> >>> terms.
> >>> >> "The fields never knew such cold as they knew that winter." What=20
> >>> kind
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> "knowing" is that? Any description of creativity ought to foregrou=
> nd
> >>> >> the
> >>> >> metaphoric nature of language.
> >>> >> I mainly worry that people think of rules as "governing"=20
> >>> rather >> than
> >>> >> as conventional. It is not a "rule" that college students dress
> >>> >> informally, but it is certainly a pattern. You haven't broken a ru=
> le
> >>> >> when you wear a tie, for whatever reason. I don't think the=20
> >>> comparison
> >>> >> holds too far (language is not just fashion), but "rule" and=20
> >>> "pattern"
> >>> >> can be very different in people's minds.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Craig
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Bruce Despain wrote:
> >>> >> > Craig,
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > I think it might be a good exercise for you to respond sometime
> >>> >> > without using the word "function" or "functional." Don't
> these=20
> >>> >> > words
> >>> >> > just provide us another way to talk about rules. The rule is=20
> >>> there
> >>> >> to
> >>> >> > *describe* something that is regular, expected, recognized, and
> >>> >> > conventional. Language needs a certain amount of=20
> >>> conventionality to
> >>> >> > convey understanding. Does a new construction arise to carriy=20
> >>> out a
> >>> >> > new function or an old function in a new way? Maybe the
> answer=20
> >>> >> > would
> >>> >> > tell us to what extent function is driving language or whether
> >>> >> > language is driving function. Consider the rhetorical=20
> >>> question, for
> >>> >> > example. This phenomenon takes a syntactic structure normally=20
> >>> used
> >>> >> to
> >>> >> > seek new information and applies it to make an assertion. We=20
> >>> could
> >>> >> > describe this phenomenon by rule in the form of a (dreaded?)
> >>> >> > "transformation" (a sense different from
> >>> >> > "generative-transformational"). The language user transforms th=
> e
> >>> >> > function of a yes-no question to that of a declarative sentence
> >>> >> simply
> >>> >> > by placing it in a rhetorical context. To compare the=20
> >>> functions of
> >>> >> > "kick" and "admire" as transitive verbs is not as useful as >>=20
> >>> > comparing
> >>> >> > them, maybe, at the level of action, one being physical and the
> >>> >> > other mental. To find a syntactic correlate to this contrast ma=
> y
> >>> >> give
> >>> >> > us a clue to where a creative act of functional transform might =
> be
> >>> >> > found. Perhaps something like these metaphors: "John kicked=20
> >>> around
> >>> >> > and then admired football." (zeugma) "Mary admired John, but=20
> >>> kicked
> >>> >> > him out of her life." We respect the "functional pressures" of
> >>> >> syntax
> >>> >> > but utilize their force to make our expressions more powerful. =
> Is
> >>> >> > this something like you have in mind?
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > Bruce
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/11/07 7:54 AM >>>
> >>> >> > Herb,
> >>> >> > I enjoyed both posts very much and will respond to both in th=
> is
> >>> >> one.
> >>> >> > I like the idea that the language is both "complex" and=20
> >>> "subtle",
> >>> >> > which implies that it's a functional complexity. We bring new
> >>> >> > constructions into play precisely because they allow us to=20
> >>> carry out
> >>> >> the
> >>> >> > various functions of language, and any attempt to describe it=20
> >>> ought
> >>> >> to
> >>> >> > pay deep respect to that. They come into being because we find=20
> >>> them
> >>> >> > useful and they become routinized (and intuitive) over time.
> >>> >> > I'm beginning to think that we use the term "rules" far too
> >>> >> readily
> >>> >> > and widely. What we are describing may in fact be a useful
> >>> >> construction
> >>> >> > or a functional pattern, not a "rule" in the way we usually
> >>> >> understand
> >>> >> > rules. Language may be better understood bottom up than top down.
> >>> >> > It does make sense to look for patterns, but when we find=20
> >>> these
> >>> >> > similarities, when we classify sentences or constructions, we=20
> >>> are >> > not
> >>> >> > necessarily discovering some sort of internal rules that they ar=
> e
> >>> >> > "following." The patterns are enormously important, and they
> do=20
> >>> tend
> >>> >> to
> >>> >> > function below consciousness for very good (functional)=20
> >>> reasons. But
> >>> >> > classifying the sentences or ascertaining the "rules" they=20
> >>> represent
> >>> >> may
> >>> >> > be very misleading. Both "kick" and "admire" take direct=20
> >>> objects, >> > not
> >>> >> > because they are transitive, but because we understand kicking=20
> >>> as a
> >>> >> > process that involves something to be kicked and admiring as a
> >>> >> process
> >>> >> > that requires something to be admired. The differences between=20
> >>> being
> >>> >> > kicked and being admired may be more important than the >> >=20
> >>> similarities.
> >>> >> > Transitivity arises because it is congruent with our=20
> >>> understanding >> > of
> >>> >> > the world. When the patterns don't fit our purposes, we bend and
> >>> >> shape
> >>> >> > them, we blur the edges.
> >>> >> > This may be why studying formal grammar doesn't seem to carry
> >>> >> over,
> >>> >> > at least not quickly or easily. We need to respect the functiona=
> l
> >>> >> > pressures, the context it arises from.
> >>> >> > When we write, we are not constructing forms; we are=20
> >>> constructing
> >>> >> > meanings. Meaning is not simply poured into neutral forms. The
> >>> >> > constructions themselves are meaningful, arising out of that
> >>> >> > meaning-making history over time.
> >>> >> > I know that probably puts me at odds with many people on
> the=20
> >>> >> > list.
> >>> >> > But that's where my current thinking is headed.
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > Craig
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > STAHLKE, HERBERT F wrote:
> >>> >> > > Craig,
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > What you describe as the verb pulling the preposition into its
> >>> >> orbit is
> >>> >> > > precisely the sort of historical change that's been going on=20
> >>> since
> >>> >> Early
> >>> >> > > Modern English and has given us the very complex and subtle=20
> >>> system
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> > > multi-word verbs we have in English today. So we have
> >>> >> constructions in
> >>> >> > > which about behaves in some ways as a preposition and in other
> >>> >> ways as a
> >>> >> > > part of the verb. And we just have to live with that fact.
> >>> >> Language
> >>> >> > > continually defies our attempts to codify it, which is what=20
> >>> makes
> >>> >> it so
> >>> >> > > endlessly fascinating to study.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Herb
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > -----Original Message-----
> >>> >> > > From: Assembly for the Teaching of English Grammar
> >>> >> > > [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> >>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> >>> >> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> >>> >> > <mailto:[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of Craig Hancock
> >>> >> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2007 9:01 AM
> >>> >> > > To: [log in to unmask]
> >>> >> > > Subject: Re: Those old transitivity blues was Help for a puzzl=
> ed
> >>> >> teacher
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Herb, Peter, Bill, Ron,
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > With apologies if they seems too theoretical for most people's
> >>> >> tastes. I
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > have been thinking about these things for several months now a=
> nd
> >>> >> have
> >>> >> > > mostly held back while the thoughts come into focus.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > The problem I currently have with tying to find a classificati=
> on
> >>> >> for
> >>> >> > > "think about" is that I am starting to believe we make these
> >>> >> categories
> >>> >> > > more important (more governing) than they actually are. We=20
> >>> tend to
> >>> >> feel
> >>> >> > > as if words have to act certain ways because of the grammar,
> >>> >> rather than
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > believing that the grammar itself arises out of our use of=20
> >>> words.
> >>> >> (Or
> >>> >> > > that it is a dynamic relationship, a lexico-grammar,=20
> >>> word-grammar,
> >>> >> > > cline.) When classification becomes an end in itself, the=20
> >>> living,
> >>> >> > > dynamic language gets left behind.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Another way to think about it is that the process of thinking =
> is
> >>> >> often
> >>> >> > > conceived of (and articulated) as "about" something, and
> over=20
> >>> time
> >>> >> > > "think" and "about" come together often enough to start feelin=
> g
> >>> like
> >>> >> a
> >>> >> > > single phrase rather than a verb plus prepositional phrase=20
> >>> with a
> >>> >> > > variable object.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > I often think about blank.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > I often think about blank
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > From this way of thinking, the verb will begin to pull the
> >>> >> preposition
> >>> >> > > into its orbit, helped by two forces-one is repetition (the=20
> >>> words
> >>> >> coming
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > together so often)--and the other is congruency with our >>
> >=20
> >>> > experience
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> > > the world, our conception of what thinking is like. In other=20
> >>> >> > > words,
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> > > continue to use it because it is practical to use it, highly
> >>> >> > > "functional." And this becomes patterned.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > From a rule based approach, we have to say that "all grammars
> >>> >> leak",
> >>> >> > > but that may be because they try to treat the language as froz=
> en
> >>> >> and not
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > dynamic. If we see the creation of phrasal verbs as a dynamic
> >>> >> process,
> >>> >> > > then it is easy to treat in-between examples as part of that
> >>> >> process of
> >>> >> > > change-of grammatical structures being lexicalized and lexical
> >>> >> terms
> >>> >> > > being pulled into the grammar. From a usage based perspective,
> >>> >> leaking
> >>> >> > > is likely. Just like words, the grammar is always coming into
> >>> >> being.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > This gives us an approach to grammar that pulls us into meanin=
> g
> >>> >> and one
> >>> >> > > that frames meaning itself as contextual and dynamic.
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Craig
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > STAHLKE, HERBERT F wrote:
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> Ron,
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Let's start with easiest of your questions, how to use >> >=20
> >>> >> information
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > like
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> this in teaching. The fact is that I wouldn't present a
> >>> >> seven-fold
> >>> >> > >> classification of anything grammatical in an ESL context.
> I=20
> >>> >> > >> might
> >>> >> be
> >>> >> > >> forced to do something like that if I were teaching Chinese
> >>> >> nominal
> >>> >> > >> classifiers, of which there are dozens, or Bantu noun classes=
> ,
> >>> >> which
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > can
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> exceed a couple dozen, but fortunately English doesn't do suc=
> h
> >>> >> things.
> >>> >> > >> What's important in developing both fluency and register=20
> >>> control
> >>> >> in
> >>> >> > >> non-native speakers is that they learn to shift particles whe=
> n
> >>> >> doing
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > so
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> is pragmatically motivated, that they learn to use a
> passive=20
> >>> when
> >>> >> that
> >>> >> > >> structure is pragmatically motivated. And this they will lea=
> rn
> >>> >> much
> >>> >> > >> better from usage and practice than from grammar drill.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> I think perhaps you confused Bill and me in the latter part o=
> f
> >>> >> your
> >>> >> > >> post. Actually, the classification I posted is from Sidney
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > Greenbaum's
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> Oxford English Grammar (OUP, 1996), so I can't take credit=20
> >>> for >> > >> it.
> >>> >> > >> Transitivity does have degrees. Intransitives take only a
> >>> >> subject,
> >>> >> > >> (mono)transitives take a subject and a direct object, and
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > ditransitives
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> (SG's "doubly transitives") take a direct object and an=20
> >>> indirect
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > object,
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> which may or may not require a preposition. Indirect=20
> >>> object, >> > >> bear
> >>> >> in
> >>> >> > >> mind, is a function, not a structure, and it can show up as=20
> >>> >> > >> either
> >>> >> a
> >>> >> > >> bare NP or as the object of a preposition. I suspect SG uses
> >>> >> > >> "monotransitivity" in a excess of clarity, the result of whic=
> h
> >>> >> isn't
> >>> >> > >> necessarily what the writer hopes for.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Actually, SG doesn't distinguish between "look at" and "look
> >>> >> after".
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > In
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> his discussion of prepositional verbs (p. 282), he uses=20
> >>> "look at"
> >>> >> as
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > an
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> example of a monotransitive prepositional verb.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Back to the question of goals for a moment. SG was writing a
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > reference
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> grammar, and so his goal was to provide as complete and=20
> >>> thorough >> > >> a
> >>> >> > >> classification of English structures as he could. Hence
> his=20
> >>> >> > >> seven
> >>> >> > >> classes of phrasal/prepositional verbs. What the ESL=20
> >>> teacher >> > >> does
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > with
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> this classification is subject to different, pedagogical
> >>> goals, and
> >>> >> I
> >>> >> > >> hope that teacher would keep SG's treatment well away from hi=
> s
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > students,
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> while being informed by it as he or she prepares lesson plans.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Herb
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> One of the great advantages of this List (and particularly=20
> >>> if one
> >>> >> has
> >>> >> > >> the
> >>> >> > >> intellectual courage to state what one knows about grammar wi=
> th
> >>> >> the
> >>> >> > >> attendant possibility of being proven to be wrong and the eve=
> n
> >>> >> worse
> >>> >> > >> possibility of realising that one has been teaching=20
> >>> something to
> >>> >> > >> students
> >>> >> > >> which is possibly incorrect) is the potential it has to
> make=20
> >>> one
> >>> >> > >> re-examine
> >>> >> > >> one's own assumptions about some point of grammar.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Herb's comments on the complexities of phrasal verbs and Bill=
> 's
> >>> >> list
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > of
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> three examples are cases in point. This query, then, is=20
> >>> just to
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > clarify
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> things in their posts and particularly in the context of ESL.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Bill's list of three is as follows:
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> I looked [up the chimney] prepositional phrase
> >>> >> > >> I [looked up] the word phrasal verb
> >>> >> > >> I looked [up] adverbial particle.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Just to avoid ambiguity, I would modify the second two as
> >>=20
> >>> > >> follows:
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> I [looked up] the word. As 'up' is an adverbial particle=20
> >>> and >> > >> as
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > 'the
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> word' is the direct object of the resultant phrasal verb, 'lo=
> ok
> >>> >> up' is
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > a
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> transitive phrasal
> >>> >> > >> verb.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> I looked [up]. As 'up' is an adverbial particle and as=20
> >>> there is
> >>> >> no
> >>> >> > >> direct
> >>> >> > >> object, 'look up' is an intransitive phrasal verb.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Would Bill agree with this modification?
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Herb's list of seven really puts the cat amonst the pigeons=20
> >>> of my
> >>> >> > >> assumptions about transitivity. Here's Bill's list:
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> 1. intransitive phrasal verbs, e.g. "give in" (surrender)
> >>> >> > >> 2. transitive phrasal verbs, e.g. "find" something "out"
> >>> >> (discover)
> >>> >> > >> 3. monotransitive prepositional verbs, e.g. "look after" (ta=
> ke
> >>> >> care
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > of)
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> 4. doubly transitive prepositional verbs, e.g. "blame"=20
> >>> something
> >>> >> "on"
> >>> >> > >> someone
> >>> >> > >> 5. copular prepositional verbs, e.g. "serve as"
> >>> >> > >> 6. monotransitive phrasal-prepositional verbs, e.g. "look=20
> >>> up to"
> >>> >> > >> (respect)
> >>> >> > >> 7. doubly transitive phrasal-prepositional verbs, e.g. "put"
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > something
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> "down to" (attribute to)
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> My problem is with 3 This is the first time that I have
> >>> >> encountered
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > the
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> term 'monotransitive' so perhaps Bill can explain the >> >=20
> >>> >> significance
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> > >> the addition of 'mono-'.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> In the case of 3, why is Bill implicitly differentiating 'loo=
> k
> >>> >> at' and
> >>> >> > >> 'look
> >>> >> > >> after'? I ask this because I am assuming that he is not
> >>=20
> >>> > >> claiming
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > that
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> 'look at' is a monotransitive prepositional verb. In the=20
> >>> case of
> >>> >> ESL,
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > I
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> think it preferable to consider them both intransitive in ord=
> er
> >>> >> not to
> >>> >> > >> muddy the transitive waters too much.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> 6 & 7 are also problematic in ESL terms for the same reason b=
> ut
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > perhaps
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> we can come to those later.
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Ron Sheen
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the
> list's=20
> >>> web
> >>> >> > >> interface at:
> >>> >> > >> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
> >>> >> > >> and select "Join or leave the list"
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the
> list's=20
> >>> web
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > > interface at:
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
> >>> >> > >> and select "Join or leave the list"
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >>
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's w=
> eb
> >>> >> > > interface at:
> >>> >> > > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
> >>> >> > > and select "Join or leave the list"
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's w=
> eb
> >>> >> > interface at:
> >>> >> > > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
> >>> >> > > and select "Join or leave the list"
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> > >
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web
> >>> >> > interface at:
> >>> >> > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
> >>> >> > and select "Join or leave the list"
> >>> >> >
> >>> >> > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
> >>> >> >
> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------=
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> >>>
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> >>>
> >>> >> NOTICE: This email message is for the sole use of the intended
> >>> >> recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged=20
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> -
> >>> > NOTICE: This email message is for the sole use of the intended
> >>> > recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged
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>
> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web
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> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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