[Fair notice: This one’s almost all theory, and may be entirely
stultifying, albeit in a potentially amusingly pompous way]
Bruce, Craig, et al.:
I think it’s important to remember in this kind of discussion
that by “formal model,” what linguists typically mean as “model within a
model-theoretic framework.” Model-theoretic frameworks attempt to describe things
in terms of two explicit components (I know this is repeating what you already
know, but I have to lay it out on the table before doing something else with
it):
·
A set of object (“symbols,” “primitives”)
·
A set of rules for manipulating the objects
Either implicitly or
explicitly, theorists also use a simplicity metric for resolving disputes about
competing ways of modeling the same thing in the same system.
There are three points about
traditional model-theoretic systems that are problematic when discussing language:
(1) They
assume that there are objects to be manipulated.
(2) Traditionally,
the operation of the system is fully determinate
(3) Traditionally
(again), the simplicity metric is expressed only in terms of number of objects
and number of rules.
Point (1) is problematic
because, from a philosophical position, one does not have to posit
objects, and, from a biological position, the neural network that language “runs
on” seems to be all connections, with no objects. That is, while a “rule” might
be formulated that describes the operation of the network, there are no observable
objects in there being manipulated. The objects may be adduced as theoretical
constructs, but the theorist then has to be very, very careful to avoid
circular reasoning. Otherwise, you can end up saying that the objects must
be there because that’s the only way your model can work, when in fact you
started by choosing a kind of model that requires objects to begin with. That
kind of argument is based on the initial assumption that your model is correct
to start with.
Point (2) makes traditional
model-theoretic systems have trouble approaching inherently indeterminate
phenomena – the kind of thing that sociolinguists sometimes try to deal with
via “variable rules.” In a traditional model-theoretic system, “variable rule”
is an oxymoron. The standard way of dealing with the problem is to say either
(a) that anything indeterminate is outside language and therefore doesn’t need
to be modeled, or (b) there is more than one determinate system, and the
speaker is switching among systems. The second option strikes me as being a
bit more responsible, but still lets the analyst avoid questioning the initial
assumption that the system has to be determinate.
Point (3) leads to simplicity
being computed relative to the model as a static whole, not relative to the operation
of the model. A version that uses two objects and three rules is automatically
simpler than a version that uses five objects and nine rules, even if the “simpler”
version requires eighty steps to model a given phenomenon instead of the twenty
the second version does.
Generative grammar deals with
(2) and (3) via the competence/performance dichotomy – if we accept the
dichotomy, then variability is a performance issue (and hence irrelevant) and
the operation of the model when performing a given task is, again, performance –
and hence irrelevant. It’s an internally consistent position.
Here’s the problem I have
with it: People don’t question it enough. It’s one of many, many ways one
might model language, but “formalizing” an account usually means having to make
it conform to this type of system – objects and rules, full determinism, and
atemporal simplicity metrics. The problem is not the framework itself, but
rather its hegemonic status. The metrics that would establish this framework as
better than others are internal to the framework itself, and while that
criticism would hold as well of any comparable framework, not consciously acknowledging
it leads to thinking that a statement about the model , by virtue of the fact
that it’s expressed in terms of the model, thereby automatically becomes a
statement about language. We lose sight of the fact that, while models can reflect
(or metaphorically represent) explanations, the act of modeling something – in and
of itself – does not constitute explanation. A valid explanation remains
valid even if it’s not formalized in a particular framework, and a potentially
infinite number of wildly wrong explanations can be easily formalized.
Bill Spruiell
Dept. of English
Central Michigan University
From: Assembly for the
Teaching of English Grammar [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Bruce
Despain
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2007 1:32 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Rules ad nauseam
Craig,
You seem to have
missed my point about rules again.
When you talk about
choice, you seem to forget that the heart of computer systems is the encoding
of decisions in binary codes (true/false). We need to avoid confusion between
the purposes of generative grammar and the purposes of generative rules.
We don't want to throw out binary codes - the formal constructs - because we
don't like what they encode. The theoretical goal ought to be the
formalization of choice. We need clarity in the formal objects.
Any decent grammar
ought to have a place for meaning, "natural" or not. How does a
grammar account for what it finds? An accounting probably involves numbers,
measures, the technologies used by science. I believe that there are
structures in the brain for language processing (Brocca's area, Wernicke's area,
etc.) It is mysterious how they get to be there. It is just as
mysterious how the 19 regions for processing visual information got there. No
doubt they will be found encoded in the DNA, I suppose. But it is
irrefutable that there are structures that process language. It is an
undecided question to what extent the grammar reflects these structures.
I hope that this is not a point at issue.
My hope would be
that a "semantically leaning" theory would tell us how to encode the
semantics involved. Social and personal interactions are certainly an
influence on how the world ought to be encoded. Perhaps "field, tenor, and
mode" are good approximations to classes of meaning, but they are still
meaning. They are attempts to make generalizations about utterances in their
extra-linguistic contexts.
A specific
"Genre," as I suppose, isolates utterances to those having a specific
purpose. It also considers other aspects of culture besides language,
such as religion, technology, kinship relations. And because language (as part
of culture) changes through time, the genre must be defined in these terms as
well. Being aware of the influence of these elements on the use of
language is crucial to writing well. I would not call this a "deeper
understanding of language," however. Formalizing these elements as part of
linguistic science is no different than formalizing any other semantic
field. I would think that they themselves need to be formally modeled
before their formal effect on grammatical structures can be explicated.
Until that is done they remain as interesting observations about language
use. (We may know that the sounds of language change, but we don't have
the tools to describe Grimm's law, or the data to describe Verner's law. It is
one thing to be aware of a phenomenon, another to describe it within the
formal constraints of science.) It is one thing to ask questions about
McDonald's ads, it is another to describe the phenomenon observed. You will be
doing a good work to generalize about these observations. Maybe such
empirical laws as are thus developed can be fit into some formal theory
someday, but I don't think functionalism fills that bill.
My stance on grammar
arising from the structure of the world is informed strongly by the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis. There is much of the opposite going on as the world and the
cultures built by man within it change. There are forces for change in
both directions. Our experience tells us that there seem to be few limits
to what a good writer can express. However, in the end I am willing to
admit the existence of ineffible concepts. We admire the creative ability
of poets in attempting to clothe such concepts with shape and size. Often
the "rules of grammar" are wrested in doing so. But it is the
"rules of formal systems" that allow us to account for how it is
done. Such rules tell us how to describe the semantics of a language --
the world view. The formal semantics are influenced (manipulated) by the
"rules of grammar."
I am presently
enjoying the study of semantic nets. This formal construct is related directly
to formal logic, but is equally influenced by the syntax and morphology of the
language being modeled. In this study (Herman Helbig's MultiNet) a situation
expressed in "Sally gave Mary a ball" would be translated to a number
of primitive objects and relations. Some of them, e.g., Benefactive, which
describes Mary's involvement in the situation, are "C-Roles" (cf.
theta roles) dictated by English and similar languages. Prototypical knowledge
guides inferences (rules of logic) that can come from the normal interpretation
of this expression. Categorical knowledge tells us that a "ball"
belongs to that class of concrete objects that have a spheroid shape.
Situational knowledge tells us about the individual persons and objects
instantiated by the situation. All of these kinds of knowledge are modeled as
parts and attributes of parts of the semantic net.
The problem with
limiting the term language to a particular language is mirrored by the differences
between a grammar of a language and the syntax of a language. "Grammar
rules" brings up the idea of the limited area of syntactic patterns and
regularities. These live and breath, but not as much perhaps as the rules of
other parts of the grammar, particularly those of semantics. "Formal
grammar" needs to include all levels and modules displaying linguistic
phenomena.
I believe that at
least an awareness of this vast field and its specializations can be very
helpful to courses in language use. This should not involve the dissing of
formalizations in general. We should be willing to view language as
multi-faceted, but still analyzable with the scientific approach. I
believe that the many facets of language reflect the organization of the
brain into modules: semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology, even orthography
(writing systems) -- the traditional breakdonwn. But this
philosophy should not distract from the scientific goal of formalizing the
description of what we observe in language, wherever we find it.
Bruce
>>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/17/07 8:32 AM
>>>
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Bruce,
Those are very complex questions, and I=E2=80=99m wondering about a way=
to=20
phrase all this so it might be of use to the group as a whole.
I don=E2=80=99t have Halliday=E2=80=99s Intro to functional
grammar wi=
th me here at=20
work, and I=E2=80=99ll consult it later, but I seem to remember him sayin=
g that=20
there is a computerized version of the grammar which works this out in=20
great detail as a system of choices. Systemic functional grammar is=20
systemic, and it is a grammar. It is a =E2=80=9Cnatural=E2=80=9D grammar,=
meaning that=20
it attempts to account for the grammar that it finds. It is=20
=E2=80=9Csemantically leaning=E2=80=9D. I think, though please correct me=
if I=E2=80=99m wrong,=20
that generative grammar is more biologically leaning, looking to=20
describe the rules for the generation of forms. A functional grammar=20
looks at grammar from the perspective of meaning, and it thinks of=20
meaning as multi-functional, as including, not just a representation of=20
the world, but interaction and the production of text. It also broadens=20
out to field, tenor, and mode, which have definitions that I won=E2=80=99=
t trust=20
to memory. Mode includes =E2=80=9Cgenre=E2=80=9D. A good deal of pedagogi=
cal interest=20
these days is in genre as a center of concern. =E2=80=9CGenre=E2=80=9D is=
looked at as=20
something purposeful, culturally formed, dynamic, staged (not just a=20
single stage). It is wide enough to include things like marriage=20
proposals along with lab reports or academic arguments. So it is typical=20
in a classroom in England or Australia to have students examine=20
advertisements and make observations about the kind of language that=20
shows up and the way it is used, then construct advertisements of their=20
own. Advertisement is a genre and it may have sub-genres. If we extend=20
this genre focus out, it can give us a way to directly link both reading=20
and writing to a deeper understanding of language and how it works in=20
the real world. The theoretical position would be that the forms of=20
language are responsive to context. I am currently working this out in a=20
Reading Literature class, starting with the notion of story and how it=20
works. How is orientation built in? How does a story writer handle=20
point-of-view (which is a technical term in literature)? I can find key=20
paragraphs and bring that right down to the level of the sentence. If=20
McDonald=E2=80=99s is now running a campaign around =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=99m =
loving it=E2=80=9D, why is that=20
effective? Is the word =E2=80=9Clove=E2=80=9D usually used that way? How=
does present=20
progressive, in this case, connect with the desire to sell hamburgers?
Here=E2=80=99s where we might differ in theoretical
perspective. You =
say the=20
following:
=E2=80=9CThe utterance dimensions are quite different from the semantic=20
structure. The semantics has been abstracted, and manipulated by=20
language, to be represented in the utterance.=E2=80=9D
I admit I=E2=80=99m not quite sure what that means or how it
works ou=
t in=20
practice. But because of my current reading in cognitive linguistics and=20
in usage based approaches, I don=E2=80=99t think of grammar =E2=80=9Crule=
s=E2=80=9D (syntax=20
rules) as having an autonomous existence that then drives discourse. It=20
may be better to think of grammar =E2=80=9Crules=E2=80=9D as patterns tha=
t arise from=20
our being in the world. We can=E2=80=99t understand language without=20
understanding the nature of cognition. The mind, as Lakoff keeps saying,=20
is deeply =E2=80=9Cembodied=E2=80=9D, and language itself is deeply influ=
enced by our=20
sensory motor experience of the world. And we can't understand language=20
without thinking of it as having a social dimension. It is not an=20
objective world, but a deeply human world that we experience through=20
language.
Here=E2=80=99s another take on it from the perspective of Adele Goldberg=
, as=20
summarized by Croft and Cruse (Cognitive Linguistics, Cambridge 2004):=20
=E2=80=9Cthe complex event or situation is treated as the primitive unit =
of=20
semantic representation, and the definitions of the roles in the event=20
are derived from the situation as a whole.=E2=80=9D As I understand this=
, this=20
means that di-transitive constructions (for example, =E2=80=9CSally gave =
Mary a=20
ball=E2=80=9D) arise from the nature of the processes, in this case givin=
g, not=20
from an abstract set of =E2=80=9Crules=E2=80=9D. She has sub-categories =
of=20
ditransitivity, which differ from each other because of the nature of=20
the processes involved. But =E2=80=9Cgiving=E2=80=9D is the prototype.(=E2=
=80=9CPrototype=E2=80=9D is an=20
important part of cognitive theory, which grounds meaning in a study of=20
how the mind works. Prototypes are very important for our understanding=20
of categories.) Other ditransitive constructions can be thought of as=20
=E2=80=9Cextensions of the prototype.=E2=80=9D
As you can see, this changes radically the notion of
=E2=80=9Crules=E2=
=80=9D and=20
their role in discourse. It looks at rules as growing out of language=20
use, not as separate from it. These are more like patterns. And any=20
attempt to reduce language down to abstractions from these patterns may=20
give us a false impression of how language works and take us away from=20
the living, dynamic language, not closer to it.=20
=E2=80=9CConstructions=E2=80=9D are themselves
meaningful, not merel=
y conveyors of=20
meaning.
From this perspective, too, grammar is learned, not
merely=20
activated. In fact, work is being done to study childhood language=20
acquisition from this perspective, and it seems to hold up very well in=20
practice.
Implications for us? There may be good reasons why =E2=80=9Cformal
gra=
mmar=E2=80=99=20
does not carry over to writing. But at the same time, we may be able to=20
make a great case for the importance of individuals being mentored into=20
language, a great case for language acquisition as a life-long process,=20
a great case for attention to language as deeply tied to the goals of=20
literacy, including reading and writing.
Craig
Bruce D. Despain wrote:
> Craig,
>
> You will probably see that our positions on functionality are not that=20
> different. The approach is just different. The imaginary
context=20
> itself has a structure -- a semantic structure that stretches across=20
> several dimensions. What we utter has to reside in a string --
just=20
> one dimension in time that has a dimension of sound that is analyzed=20
> into multiple dimensions. The utterance dimensions are quite=20
> different from the semantic structure. The semantics has been=20
> abstracted, and manipulated by language, to be represented in the=20
> utterance. There is a lot missing; there is a lot filled in. I
am=20
> looking for a set of functions in the mathematical sense that can use=20
> the semantic fields (planes, layers, dimensions) as its domain and map=20
> their values onto a range in the linguistic planes of syntax,=20
> morphology, phonology, orthographics. Would you claim there to be
a=20
> linguistic plane of "functional" elements that these semantics
get=20
> mapped to? Or would it be better to say that these elements are a=20
> part of the semantics and remain there only to be discerned after the=20
> linguistic elements have been displayed to the mind?
>
> The "functional" layer, maybe, is a filtering of the already
complex=20
> clumping of semantic elements. What is its nature? Perhaps
it=20
> doesn't work with elements at all. But science needs an analysis
into=20
> parts. Can the context of an utterance be described in terms
other=20
> than the terms that describe the rest of the semantic layers? I=20
> wonder if maybe it is "simply" another way of dividing up the
layers=20
> of a semantic analysis. The example I gave from Bolinger was meant
to=20
> demonstrate just what you were saying about the ubiquitous clumping of=20
> semantic elements in the language (English) idiom. We could say it
is=20
> "functional" or we could say it is a "hidden" part of
the semantics =20
> -- the semantics of an "extra-linguistic" context -- one
that could=20
> be coded in language, if we chose to. The semantics begs for=20
> description (some scientists have used rules of the form used in logic=20
> and mathematics) and I simply think that the "functional" does
too.
>
> Bruce
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Hancock"
<[log in to unmask]>
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 8:29 AM
> Subject: Re: Rules was Those old transitivity blues
>
>
>> Bruce,
>> Thanks for the warm words. I do think this is a good
faith=20
>> conversation, and I'll try to keep on in that tone.
>> We certainly do need context to understand a great deal
of=20
>> discourse, and I'm not sure why you would present that as an
argument=20
>> against the functional. "How cold does it have to get" could
mean=20
>> many things, and the only way it can include the idea of shutting a=20
>> window is to put it into an imaginary context. A functional
approach=20
>> is not going to say that we can infer context from a form, but the=20
>> opposite--that we need context, and that the formal structures we=20
>> utter are context sensitive. "How cold does it have to get"
makes no=20
>> sense out of context, so we infer a context for it. I would see it
as=20
>> what usage based construction grammar calls a
"schema", a form=20
>> meaning pairing unpredicted by the general rules of a formal syntax=20
>> and one that has blanks to fill in. "How much snow
has to pile up=20
>> before you shovel it?" "How much does the garbage have to
stink=20
>> before you take it out?" "How many examples do I have to
give before=20
>> a concept comes through?" The schema brings with it a kind
of=20
>> sarcasm or rudeness that is part of its meaning. Rudeness is part
of=20
>> the schema.
>> "Schema" are one of the patterns cognitive
linguists use to argue=20
>> against the innateness of grammar. They are clearly learned,
clearly=20
>> language dependent (and not universal.) If we can learn schema=20
>> rapidly and easily, we have evidence of the ability to learn other=20
>> patterns.
>> Many grammatical constructions become lexicalized and then
pick up=20
>> meanings somewhat unpredictable from their parts. Any approach to=20
>> grammar will have to accommodate that. Any theory of language
should=20
>> accomodate the fact that grammatical constructions are constantly=20
>> coming into being.
>> Dividing subject function up into grammatical subject,
actor, and=20
>> theme is not at all ambiguous. My experience, in fact, is that much=20
>> of the confusion about subject in most students' minds comes from=20
>> believing that a subject is the first thing and the actor and the=20
>> focus of the proposition; so when those separate functions are=20
>> acknowledged, they have an easier time--a much easier time--with
the=20
>> concept. It is a way of making the notion of "subject" more
precise.=20
>> Traditional grammar tries to pass it off as innate or intuitive,
when=20
>> the intuitions are quite fuzzy. Tag questions work because they
allow=20
>> us to isolate the grammatical subject from other competing=20
>> possibilities, such as coming first or doing the deed. A deeper=20
>> understanding of what we mean by subject carries over into reading=20
>> and writing in a very useful way. We have a way of understanding
why=20
>> a writer might choose one form over the other within the flow of=20
>> discourse.
>> The desire for a one-to-one mapping between structure and
function=20
>> may be a desire for neat and clean categories in a world where
those=20
>> are rare. Does the category "hammer" include sledge hammer?
How about=20
>> a rubber mallet? Is a nail gun a kind of hammer? In what ways is it
a=20
>> gun? If we look closely at the cognitive nature of categories, we=20
>> find that many categories have elements that have only loose family=20
>> relationships with each other. Some elements of the category seem=20
>> more central than others. When I think hammer, I think claw hammer.
A=20
>> nail gun has a trigger and shoots things, but so does a hose
nozzle.=20
>> If we look back from the functional end, we can see something like=20
>> "hammering in nails" as a function that can be performed in
at least=20
>> two ways, one of them invented fairly recently. I use my screw
driver=20
>> to open paint cans, and I have seen my wife use one to loosen soil.=20
>> The other day, I used one to pry open a stuck window.
>> And a hammer, of course, has a form that fits its
function. It's=20
>> not that we had them lying around and then decided to hammer nails=20
>> with them, but the need to have something to hammer nails has=20
>> influenced the development of the hammer (and now the nail gun.)=20
>> Anyone who hammers as awkwardly as I do knows what the claw is for.=20
>> Mallets are good for pounding. The analogy may or may not carry
over=20
>> to language, but from a functional perspective, the belief is that
it=20
>> does. Form and function are deeply connected.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>> Bruce Despain wrote:
>>> Craig,
>>> I'm sorry for the disagreement, but I don't think it is as
serious=20
>>> as you make it out to be. Maybe I made some of my positions
out to=20
>>> be stronger than they actually are. However, that said,
there are a=20
>>> few comments I would still like to make about your position. What
I=20
>>> hope for with the word "function" is that the
mathematical sense or=20
>>> formal definition can be made to work with the less formal=20
>>> meanings. What I mean is that "function" ought to
be formalized,=20
>>> even from the general metaphorical uses it has. This is not
about=20
>>> the word but about the goal of a scientific approach. As
the=20
>>> designation of a role, the word ought to refer to something that
can=20
>>> be defined in less vague terms, elements with more basic meaning.
=20
>>> (You should be very cautious about your quotes. There is a world
of=20
>>> difference between a /function/ and "function.") I would
like to=20
>>> think that "role" can be defined as a mathematical
/relation/, which=20
>>> is like a /function/ but has values that range over
"true" and=20
>>> "false" rather than numbers or points on a cline.
A subject is one=20
>>> of your ambiguous relations: logical subject, grammatical subject.
I=20
>>> think that the tools of linguistics need to be scientifically=20
>>> qualified. GT grammar has to concentrate on the syntactic
aspects=20
>>> of grammatical analysis. If that is not enough, if it
ignores=20
>>> spelling, if it ignores aspects of meaning, if it ignores word=20
>>> structure, maybe it's time to to develop a formal approach that
will=20
>>> describe these other aspects of language. What I hate is to take
a=20
>>> tool, like an ax, emphasize its function, find it being used as
a=20
>>> hammer, and then claim that these are two aspects of the same
tool. =20
>>> It's much better, I think, to point out the structural
similarities=20
>>> between a hammer and an ax, and point out how these make it
possible=20
>>> for them to exchange roles for certain jobs. Your example of the
use=20
>>> of "it" as a place holder for the subject of a
passive: I would be=20
>>> very suspect of any syntactic theory that made it
"superfluous." If=20
>>> the semantics of the sentence are being described without it,=20
>>> elements at a higher syntactic level, e.g., the declarative=20
>>> sentence, would still have to be demonstrated to be accepted as=20
>>> grammatical, elements which without it could not exist. In
my=20
>>> example from a previous post the "shut the window" was
an essential=20
>>> part of the meaning of "How cold does it have to
get?" The=20
>>> extralinguistic context contributed the imperative portion by=20
>>> supplying "before you shut the window." In this
sense, a=20
>>> superfluous element is not one that does not belong to the
theory,=20
>>> just one that it doesn't have to be uttered to be
understood. To=20
>>> use an example from Bollinger: a lawyer advises a debtor that
he=20
>>> doesn't need to pay a particular bill because "the statute
of=20
>>> limitations has expired on that bill." He does not mean
that the=20
>>> statute is no longer in force, but that the period of time
specified=20
>>> in that statute for a bill of that kind has expired. The
desire to=20
>>> use words in this kind of "non-superfluous" way is
omnipresent in=20
>>> language, especially poetry. It keeps the language mavins
and=20
>>> critics of language use very busy. It comes when we ignore
the=20
>>> original intent of the ax and change its functionality to a
hammer. =20
>>> It may be illogical but we take advantage of the structure we
have=20
>>> for a different use. This is called "exaption" in
evolutionary=20
>>> biology. I don't mind the fact that we disagree. I highly
respect=20
>>> your experience and skills at teaching English writing. I've
always=20
>>> admired a good writer and hope someday to do better at explaining
my=20
>>> own ideas and understandings. This is, I hope, a good forum
for=20
>>> doing so. Bruce
>>>
>>> >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/15/07
5:46 AM >>>
>>> Bruce,
>>> The term "function" seems to have a
long, venerable history in
>>> linguistics. The OED cites both Bloomfield and C. C. Fries.
Halliday
>>> tends to use the term much as many of us use it on list. We can
put
>>> words or constructions roughly into classes, which tell us
something
>>> about the meaning potential of the word or structure. The word
>>> "function" designates the role of the word or word group
within a
>>> particular instance of use. In the previous sentence, "The
word
>>> function" is noun phrase acting as subject. (It also acts us
agent of
>>> "designates". And it is unmarked theme in the
theme/rheme structure o=
f
>>> the clause.) It is not uncommon for a structure to have more than
one
>>> function.
>>> I don't think it is accurate to say that the
functionalists don't=20
>>> use
>>> the tools of linguistics. The primary difference is that they see
>>> language as innately functional, not just a formal system that can
th=
en
>>> be put to use in functional ways. Generative grammar is often
>>> criticized from the functional side for calling everything that
doesn=
't
>>> fit neatly into its theory peripheral or unimportant. It becomes
so
>>> abstract that it no longer seems to represent what many of us
think o=
f
>>> as language.
>>> There may in fact be many cases in which the
passive is more prima=
ry
>>> than the active. There is no doubt a good reason why (according to
>>> Biber et al) passives are eight times more likely to show up in
>>> academic discourse. From a functional perpsective, active and
passive
>>> give us alternative choices, and each gives us a different
meaning.
>>> Someone asks "Who gave the book to
Charlie?" You may likely reply=20
>>> "It
>>> was given by his wife." This allows us to put given information
("It"=
)
>>> first and new information in clause ending prominence. Whether or
not
>>> this is thought of as superfluous is a theoretical position, not a
>>> scientific one. I find myself much more attracted to the theory
that
>>> explores how these structures function in the world. If we
theorize
>>> about them out of context, we may end up with a distorted theory.
>>> At some point, of course, we need to agree to
disagree. I am a=20
>>> writer
>>> and writing teacher and somewhat a learning specialist by position
an=
d
>>> you are a mathematician, so that may explain a great detail. I
like
>>> math and always did well in it, but I do not think it is a good
model
>>> for the complexities of language. And I think it is misleading to
cal=
l
>>> any approaches that aren't mathematical less rigorous or
scientific.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>> >
>>> > I think my concern is really quite far from the classroom,
for=20
>>> which I
>>> > apologize. It's more like a paleontologist using the
tools of
>>> geology to
>>> > solve biological questions. I think the functionalists
need to=20
>>> use > some
>>> > more tools of linguistics to solve their language
questions. I=20
>>> see no
>>> > sense debating the cline of polite requests, whether the points
are
>>> > continuous of discontinuous, or adjusted up or down by
context, if
>>> we have
>>> > no way to measure where the points are. Wouldn't it be
helpful to=20
>>> have
>>> > measures? Technology can help science to collect and
analyze their
>>> data.
>>> > The theory can only take us so far. What? It
might be refuted if=20
>>> its
>>> > predictions cannot be corroborated. My point in
segmenting the
>>> > differently formulated requests was show the direction toward
=20
>>> some > kind
>>> > of measure. This is not just by tallying up the units
of meaning b=
ut
>>> > would involve weighing them in context. Let's
callibrate the=20
>>> cline and
>>> > establish points or regions along it. I don't think
the=20
>>> instruments > for
>>> > doing such a thing are developed. Like a paleontologist
we're just
>>> > waiting for the next discovery.
>>> >
>>> > If the theory helps to teach the concepts that need teaching,
more=20
>>> > power
>>> > to it. Some models are helpful, but others can be
disruptive in th=
e
>>> > acquisition of a skill. I think of the power that
certain images
>>> have in
>>> > teaching music and voice. Educators have learned that
certain visu=
al
>>> > metaphors guide the mind in some mysterious way to produce
or=20
>>> reproduce
>>> > the sounds desired. I sure wish I knew what the rules
were behind=20
>>> > these
>>> > secrets (in the brain, in the mind).
>>> >
>>> > Bruce
>>> >
>>> >>>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]> 10/12/07
1:59 PM >>>
>>> >
>>> > Bruce,
>>> > I'll check out definitions for
"functional" in Halliday and=20
>>> get > back
>>> > to you. I admit I'm not using the term as a mathematician
>=20
>>> would--perhaps
>>> > more like a biologist, as in "what is the function of
the placenta
>>> > within the reproductive system." I don't think
mathematical models=20
>>> work
>>> > well for language--once you strip it of its semantic and
discourse
>>> > content and context, you end up with a view of language
that=20
>>> doesn't > fit
>>> > what we find in the world. I don't think an ecology is
less=20
>>> scientific
>>> > than classical biology. It just has a different (systemic and
>>> > functional) orientation. It asks a different set of
questions,=20
>>> ones > that
>>> > may yet save the world.
>>> > Ordering or requesting politely might be
thought of as different
>>> > points on a cline. One is not necessarily more primary than
the=20
>>> other,
>>> > and the words of politeness won't be superfluous to the
human=20
>>> relations
>>> > we are fostering though language. The same would be true of
passive=
s.
>>> > You can certainly say that the unmarked or default is the
active, b=
ut
>>> > they do not mean the same thing if you include things like
>=20
>>> propositional
>>> > focus or textual unity within your definition of meaning. In
the
>>> > language of cognitive linguistics, different versions will=20
>>> construe the
>>> > world differently. In functional grammar, grammatical subject
is a
>>> > separate function from actor or agent, though they
generally=20
>>> co-occur.
>>> > When we vary from that co-occurrence, we are simply
predicating a
>>> > statement about another element. One is not necessarily more
primar=
y,
>>> > and the extra words are not superfluous, but highly
functional.
>>> > I don't mean to imply that generative
grammar presents rules as
>>> > regulative. I do think most people believe grammar rules are
rules=20
>>> that
>>> > you are supposed to follow, not just patterns that arise from
>=20
>>> purposeful
>>> > use of language. And when we abstract these rules from
context, we=20
>>> pull
>>> > further and further away from the living language. If we use
the te=
rm
>>> > "pattern", perhaps we could change that.
>>> > I think it might be fine to teach
generative grammar in the=20
>>> schools
>>> > as a discipline of inquiry, but I don't think it will help
us=20
>>> develop a
>>> > view of language that will carry over into reading and
writing. I
>>> > believe both functional and cognitive approaches have much
more=20
>>> promise
>>> > for that.
>>> >
>>> > Craig
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Bruce Despain wrote:
>>> >> Craig,
>>> >>
>>> >> With my experience in math, I have a difficulty with the
word
>>> >> "function" similarly as you do with
"rule." For the=20
>>> mathematician the
>>> >> function is a process that has a domain or set of input
values=20
>>> (one or
>>> >> more parameters) and a range or output value. The
transformation=20
>>> is a
>>> >> mapping or relation (one to one, one to many, many to
one) of one=20
>>> set
>>> >> of values onto another. This way of picturing the
relationship as=
a
>>> >> process is a convenience for understanding the
model. In this way
>>> >> rules and patterns are simply two ways of viewing the
same
>>> >> phenomena. The rules as functions output a
value, which can=20
>>> often be
>>> >> considered a pattern. It is the analysis of
patterns that allow=20
>>> us to
>>> >> describe them by rule. Generative rules (now
called Backus-Naur
>>> >> form) were developed with this in mind. Rules in
this sense are n=
ot
>>> >> regulative, except to the person who wants a description
of the
>>> >> structure. They show how to go about building it so
as to get the
>>> >> best results. (The are not generative either, in
the sense of=20
>>> giving
>>> >> birth to ideas.)
>>> >>
>>> >> To beat a dead horse: the normal way to request behavior
of anothe=
r
>>> >> person is with an imperative ("Shut the
window"), but we can use t=
he
>>> >> yes-no interrogative to inquire about a person's
disposition to=20
>>> behave
>>> >> in a certain way: "Will you shut the window?"
or a declarative "It=
's
>>> >> cold in here" or even a wh-interrogative, "How
cold does it have t=
o
>>> >> get?" If the syntactic description of the sentence
is limited to=20
>>> such
>>> >> sentence types, it is easy to see that Halladay needed
another lev=
el
>>> >> (meta-) on which to express the actual intent of the
question apar=
t
>>> >> from its form. Hence, at this level (interactive)
the three=20
>>> sentences
>>> >> that are used for the same purpose are of the same type.
>>> >> If we subscribe to the compositionality of language
meaning, there
>>> >> would certainly be more elementary units of meaning of
which the=20
>>> more
>>> >> complex constructions are composed. Couldn't these
be considered
>>> >> primary? If it takes me more words (syntactically)
to say somethi=
ng
>>> >> one way, perhaps that would be a rough indication of the
number of
>>> >> meaning elements it could be broken down into. The
active sentenc=
e
>>> >> usually has one less word than the passive, which uses a
form of=20
>>> "be"
>>> >> with the passive participle. If we're counting
morphemes, we woul=
d
>>> >> have to consider the participle ending as another
element. The
>>> >> passive seems to be less primary from an analytic point
of view. =20
>>> The
>>> >> same argument makes sentences with a progressive aspect
less prima=
ry
>>> >> than corresponding ones with a simple finite verb.
They are
>>> >> structurally more complex and seem also to contain
additional
>>> >> meaningful units. Perhaps if we are allowed to cut
away the
>>> >> superfluous content of the above syntactically
different=20
>>> sentences, we
>>> >> can be left with a core set of meanings at the
interactive level. =
A
>>> >> transformation would seem to be an appropriate model for
stating=20
>>> such
>>> >> a relationship.
>>> >>
>>> >> My intent was to make a point that has less to do with
pedagogy,
>>> >> perhaps, than formal models. Yet, we must admit
that kids today=20
>>> have
>>> >> been given the opportunity to learn a good deal of these
concepts =
in
>>> >> their math classes. Maybe pedagogy needs to relate
to this kind
>>> >> of educational curriculum to some extent.
Many branches of
>>> >> linguistics are trying to bridge this abysmal gap between
the
>>> >> humanities and science. I think some of it ought to
trickle down =
to
>>> >> the lower grades. Maybe we should teach using the
mathematical
>>> >> approach to functions and rules. If not literally,
perhaps only
>>> >> metaphorically.
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce
>>> >>
>>> >> >>> Craig Hancock <[log in to unmask]>
10/11/07 9:40 AM >>>
>>> >> Bruce,
>>> >> It may be hard to use the term
"transformation" without=20
>>> bringing in
>>> >> all the apparatus that has historically come with it. It
may be=20
>>> better
>>> >> to talk about alternative options, perhaps ones that
complement ea=
ch
>>> >> other and stand at more or less equal status. So a
question is not=
a
>>> >> transformed statement, but just an alternative
choice--offering
>>> >> information or requesting information as both necessary
options=20
>>> in the
>>> >> system. We can also request or offer goods and services,
and we ha=
ve
>>> >> ways to carry that out.
>>> >> Halliday describes three different
metafunctions, one being
>>> >> interpersonal and interactive, another being
representational,=20
>>> and the
>>> >> other being largely textual. So you might say that a
passive=20
>>> sentence
>>> >> has been "transformed" from an active one, but
a functional analys=
is
>>> >> would emphasize that a different entity has been moved
into >>=20
>>> grammatical
>>> >> subject role to ground the proposition, while the role of
doer of=20
>>> the
>>> >> action (representation) has been left out or shifted into
the
>>> >> predicate.
>>> >> This may happen for textual reasons, perhaps to keep a
topic in
>>> >> extended
>>> >> focus. If you treat this systematically, then one is not
a
>>> >> transformation of the other, just ways to accommodate
different
>>> >> functions within the structure of the clause. It may
be=20
>>> misleading to
>>> >> think of one as more primary than the other, even if more
common.
>>> >> We can certainly divide verbs into
physical (material) and ment=
al
>>> >> (cognitive), and we do mix those types up in a sort of
metaphor=20
>>> all >> the
>>> >> time. When the wind "howls", we are granting it
a speech act. When=
I
>>> >> "fall" for someone, I'm describing emotional
change in physical=20
>>> terms.
>>> >> "The fields never knew such cold as they knew that
winter." What=20
>>> kind
>>> >> of
>>> >> "knowing" is that? Any description of
creativity ought to foregrou=
nd
>>> >> the
>>> >> metaphoric nature of language.
>>> >> I mainly worry that people think of
rules as "governing"=20
>>> rather >> than
>>> >> as conventional. It is not a "rule" that
college students dress
>>> >> informally, but it is certainly a pattern. You haven't
broken a ru=
le
>>> >> when you wear a tie, for whatever reason. I don't think
the=20
>>> comparison
>>> >> holds too far (language is not just fashion), but
"rule" and=20
>>> "pattern"
>>> >> can be very different in people's minds.
>>> >>
>>> >> Craig
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce Despain wrote:
>>> >> > Craig,
>>> >> >
>>> >> > I think it might be a good exercise for you to
respond sometime
>>> >> > without using the word "function" or
"functional." Don't these=20
>>> >> > words
>>> >> > just provide us another way to talk about
rules. The rule is=20
>>> there
>>> >> to
>>> >> > *describe* something that is regular, expected,
recognized, and
>>> >> > conventional. Language needs a certain amount
of=20
>>> conventionality to
>>> >> > convey understanding. Does a new construction
arise to carriy=20
>>> out a
>>> >> > new function or an old function in a new way?
Maybe the answer=20
>>> >> > would
>>> >> > tell us to what extent function is driving language
or whether
>>> >> > language is driving function. Consider the
rhetorical=20
>>> question, for
>>> >> > example. This phenomenon takes a syntactic
structure normally=20
>>> used
>>> >> to
>>> >> > seek new information and applies it to make an
assertion. We=20
>>> could
>>> >> > describe this phenomenon by rule in the form of a
(dreaded?)
>>> >> > "transformation" (a sense different from
>>> >> > "generative-transformational"). The
language user transforms th=
e
>>> >> > function of a yes-no question to that of a
declarative sentence
>>> >> simply
>>> >> > by placing it in a rhetorical context. To
compare the=20
>>> functions of
>>> >> > "kick" and "admire" as
transitive verbs is not as useful as >>=20
>>> > comparing
>>> >> > them, maybe, at the level of action, one being
physical and the
>>> >> > other mental. To find a syntactic correlate to
this contrast ma=
y
>>> >> give
>>> >> > us a clue to where a creative act of functional
transform might =
be
>>> >> > found. Perhaps something like these metaphors:
"John kicked=20
>>> around
>>> >> > and then admired football." (zeugma) "Mary
admired John, but=20
>>> kicked
>>> >> > him out of her life." We respect the
"functional pressures" of
>>> >> syntax
>>> >> > but utilize their force to make our expressions more
powerful. =
Is
>>> >> > this something like you have in mind?
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Bruce
>>> >> >
>>> >> > >>> Craig Hancock
<[log in to unmask]> 10/11/07 7:54 AM >>>
>>> >> > Herb,
>>> >> > I enjoyed both posts very much and
will respond to both in th=
is
>>> >> one.
>>> >> > I like the idea that the language
is both "complex" and=20
>>> "subtle",
>>> >> > which implies that it's a functional complexity. We
bring new
>>> >> > constructions into play precisely because they allow
us to=20
>>> carry out
>>> >> the
>>> >> > various functions of language, and any attempt to
describe it=20
>>> ought
>>> >> to
>>> >> > pay deep respect to that. They come into being
because we find=20
>>> them
>>> >> > useful and they become routinized (and intuitive)
over time.
>>> >> > I'm beginning to think that we use
the term "rules" far too
>>> >> readily
>>> >> > and widely. What we are describing may in fact be a
useful
>>> >> construction
>>> >> > or a functional pattern, not a "rule" in
the way we usually
>>> >> understand
>>> >> > rules. Language may be better understood bottom up
than top down.
>>> >> > It does make sense to look
for patterns, but when we find=20
>>> these
>>> >> > similarities, when we classify sentences or
constructions, we=20
>>> are >> > not
>>> >> > necessarily discovering some sort of internal rules
that they ar=
e
>>> >> > "following." The patterns are enormously
important, and they do=20
>>> tend
>>> >> to
>>> >> > function below consciousness for very good
(functional)=20
>>> reasons. But
>>> >> > classifying the sentences or ascertaining the
"rules" they=20
>>> represent
>>> >> may
>>> >> > be very misleading. Both "kick" and
"admire" take direct=20
>>> objects, >> > not
>>> >> > because they are transitive, but because we
understand kicking=20
>>> as a
>>> >> > process that involves something to be kicked and
admiring as a
>>> >> process
>>> >> > that requires something to be admired. The
differences between=20
>>> being
>>> >> > kicked and being admired may be more important than
the >> >=20
>>> similarities.
>>> >> > Transitivity arises because it is congruent with
our=20
>>> understanding >> > of
>>> >> > the world. When the patterns don't fit our purposes,
we bend and
>>> >> shape
>>> >> > them, we blur the edges.
>>> >> > This may be why studying formal
grammar doesn't seem to carry
>>> >> over,
>>> >> > at least not quickly or easily. We need to respect
the functiona=
l
>>> >> > pressures, the context it arises from.
>>> >> > When we write, we are not
constructing forms; we are=20
>>> constructing
>>> >> > meanings. Meaning is not simply poured into neutral
forms. The
>>> >> > constructions themselves are meaningful, arising out
of that
>>> >> > meaning-making history over time.
>>> >> > I know that probably puts me at
odds with many people on the=20
>>> >> > list.
>>> >> > But that's where my current thinking is headed.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Craig
>>> >> >
>>> >> >
>>> >> > STAHLKE, HERBERT F wrote:
>>> >> > > Craig,
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > What you describe as the verb pulling the
preposition into its
>>> >> orbit is
>>> >> > > precisely the sort of historical change that's
been going on=20
>>> since
>>> >> Early
>>> >> > > Modern English and has given us the very
complex and subtle=20
>>> system
>>> >> of
>>> >> > > multi-word verbs we have in English
today. So we have
>>> >> constructions in
>>> >> > > which about behaves in some ways as a
preposition and in other
>>> >> ways as a
>>> >> > > part of the verb. And we just have to
live with that fact.
>>> >> Language
>>> >> > > continually defies our attempts to codify it,
which is what=20
>>> makes
>>> >> it so
>>> >> > > endlessly fascinating to study.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Herb
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > -----Original Message-----
>>> >> > > From: Assembly for the Teaching of English
Grammar
>>> >> > > [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
>>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
>>> >> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
>>> >> > <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
On Behalf Of Craig Hancock
>>> >> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2007 9:01 AM
>>> >> > > To: [log in to unmask]
>>> >> > > Subject: Re: Those old transitivity blues was
Help for a puzzl=
ed
>>> >> teacher
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Herb, Peter, Bill, Ron,
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > With apologies if they seems too theoretical
for most people's
>>> >> tastes. I
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > have been thinking about these things for
several months now a=
nd
>>> >> have
>>> >> > > mostly held back while the thoughts come into
focus.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > The problem I currently have with tying to find
a classificati=
on
>>> >> for
>>> >> > > "think about" is that I am starting
to believe we make these
>>> >> categories
>>> >> > > more important (more governing) than they
actually are. We=20
>>> tend to
>>> >> feel
>>> >> > > as if words have to act certain ways because of
the grammar,
>>> >> rather than
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > believing that the grammar itself arises out of
our use of=20
>>> words.
>>> >> (Or
>>> >> > > that it is a dynamic relationship, a lexico-grammar,=20
>>> word-grammar,
>>> >> > > cline.) When classification becomes an end in
itself, the=20
>>> living,
>>> >> > > dynamic language gets left behind.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Another way to think about it is that the
process of thinking =
is
>>> >> often
>>> >> > > conceived of (and articulated) as
"about" something, and over=20
>>> time
>>> >> > > "think" and "about" come
together often enough to start feelin=
g
>>> like
>>> >> a
>>> >> > > single phrase rather than a verb plus
prepositional phrase=20
>>> with a
>>> >> > > variable object.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > I often think about blank.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > I often think about blank
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > From this way of thinking, the verb will
begin to pull the
>>> >> preposition
>>> >> > > into its orbit, helped by two forces-one is
repetition (the=20
>>> words
>>> >> coming
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > together so often)--and the other is congruency
with our >> >=20
>>> > experience
>>> >> of
>>> >> > > the world, our conception of what thinking is
like. In other=20
>>> >> > > words,
>>> >> we
>>> >> > > continue to use it because it is practical to
use it, highly
>>> >> > > "functional." And this becomes
patterned.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > From a rule based approach, we have to
say that "all grammars
>>> >> leak",
>>> >> > > but that may be because they try to treat the
language as froz=
en
>>> >> and not
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > dynamic. If we see the creation of phrasal
verbs as a dynamic
>>> >> process,
>>> >> > > then it is easy to treat in-between examples as
part of that
>>> >> process of
>>> >> > > change-of grammatical structures being
lexicalized and lexical
>>> >> terms
>>> >> > > being pulled into the grammar. From a usage
based perspective,
>>> >> leaking
>>> >> > > is likely. Just like words, the grammar is
always coming into
>>> >> being.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > This gives us an approach to grammar that pulls
us into meanin=
g
>>> >> and one
>>> >> > > that frames meaning itself as contextual and
dynamic.
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Craig
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > STAHLKE, HERBERT F wrote:
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> Ron,
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Let's start with easiest of your questions,
how to use >> >=20
>>> >> information
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > like
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> this in teaching. The fact is that I
wouldn't present a
>>> >> seven-fold
>>> >> > >> classification of anything grammatical in
an ESL context. I=20
>>> >> > >> might
>>> >> be
>>> >> > >> forced to do something like that if I were
teaching Chinese
>>> >> nominal
>>> >> > >> classifiers, of which there are dozens, or
Bantu noun classes=
,
>>> >> which
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > can
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> exceed a couple dozen, but fortunately
English doesn't do suc=
h
>>> >> things.
>>> >> > >> What's important in developing both fluency
and register=20
>>> control
>>> >> in
>>> >> > >> non-native speakers is that they learn to
shift particles whe=
n
>>> >> doing
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > so
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> is pragmatically motivated, that they learn
to use a passive=20
>>> when
>>> >> that
>>> >> > >> structure is pragmatically motivated.
And this they will lea=
rn
>>> >> much
>>> >> > >> better from usage and practice than from
grammar drill.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> I think perhaps you confused Bill and me in
the latter part o=
f
>>> >> your
>>> >> > >> post. Actually, the classification I
posted is from Sidney
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > Greenbaum's
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> Oxford English Grammar (OUP, 1996), so I
can't take credit=20
>>> for >> > >> it.
>>> >> > >> Transitivity does have degrees.
Intransitives take only a
>>> >> subject,
>>> >> > >> (mono)transitives take a subject and a
direct object, and
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > ditransitives
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> (SG's "doubly transitives") take
a direct object and an=20
>>> indirect
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > object,
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> which may or may not require a
preposition. Indirect=20
>>> object, >> > >> bear
>>> >> in
>>> >> > >> mind, is a function, not a structure, and
it can show up as=20
>>> >> > >> either
>>> >> a
>>> >> > >> bare NP or as the object of a
preposition. I suspect SG uses
>>> >> > >> "monotransitivity" in a excess of
clarity, the result of whic=
h
>>> >> isn't
>>> >> > >> necessarily what the writer hopes for.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Actually, SG doesn't distinguish between
"look at" and "look
>>> >> after".
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > In
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> his discussion of prepositional verbs (p.
282), he uses=20
>>> "look at"
>>> >> as
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > an
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> example of a monotransitive prepositional
verb.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Back to the question of goals for a
moment. SG was writing a
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > reference
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> grammar, and so his goal was to provide as
complete and=20
>>> thorough >> > >> a
>>> >> > >> classification of English structures as he
could. Hence his=20
>>> >> > >> seven
>>> >> > >> classes of phrasal/prepositional
verbs. What the ESL=20
>>> teacher >> > >> does
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > with
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> this classification is subject to
different, pedagogical
>>> goals, and
>>> >> I
>>> >> > >> hope that teacher would keep SG's treatment
well away from hi=
s
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > students,
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> while being informed by it as he or she
prepares lesson plans.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Herb
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> One of the great advantages of this List
(and particularly=20
>>> if one
>>> >> has
>>> >> > >> the
>>> >> > >> intellectual courage to state what one
knows about grammar wi=
th
>>> >> the
>>> >> > >> attendant possibility of being proven to be
wrong and the eve=
n
>>> >> worse
>>> >> > >> possibility of realising that one has been
teaching=20
>>> something to
>>> >> > >> students
>>> >> > >> which is possibly incorrect) is the potential
it has to make=20
>>> one
>>> >> > >> re-examine
>>> >> > >> one's own assumptions about some point of
grammar.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Herb's comments on the complexities of
phrasal verbs and Bill=
's
>>> >> list
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > of
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> three examples are cases in point.
This query, then, is=20
>>> just to
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > clarify
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> things in their posts and particularly in
the context of ESL.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Bill's list of three is as follows:
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> I looked [up the chimney] prepositional
phrase
>>> >> > >> I [looked up] the word phrasal verb
>>> >> > >> I looked [up] adverbial particle.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Just to avoid ambiguity, I would modify the
second two as >>=20
>>> > >> follows:
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> I [looked up] the word.
As 'up' is an adverbial particle=20
>>> and >> > >> as
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > 'the
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> word' is the direct object of the resultant
phrasal verb, 'lo=
ok
>>> >> up' is
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > a
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> transitive phrasal
>>> >> > >> verb.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> I looked [up]. As 'up' is an
adverbial particle and as=20
>>> there is
>>> >> no
>>> >> > >> direct
>>> >> > >> object, 'look up' is an intransitive
phrasal verb.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Would Bill agree with this modification?
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Herb's list of seven really puts the cat
amonst the pigeons=20
>>> of my
>>> >> > >> assumptions about transitivity.
Here's Bill's list:
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> 1. intransitive phrasal verbs, e.g.
"give in" (surrender)
>>> >> > >> 2. transitive phrasal verbs, e.g.
"find" something "out"
>>> >> (discover)
>>> >> > >> 3. monotransitive prepositional
verbs, e.g. "look after" (ta=
ke
>>> >> care
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > of)
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> 4. doubly transitive prepositional
verbs, e.g. "blame"=20
>>> something
>>> >> "on"
>>> >> > >> someone
>>> >> > >> 5. copular prepositional verbs, e.g.
"serve as"
>>> >> > >> 6. monotransitive phrasal-prepositional
verbs, e.g. "look=20
>>> up to"
>>> >> > >> (respect)
>>> >> > >> 7. doubly transitive
phrasal-prepositional verbs, e.g. "put"
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > something
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> "down to" (attribute to)
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> My problem is with 3 This is the
first time that I have
>>> >> encountered
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > the
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> term 'monotransitive' so perhaps Bill can
explain the >> >=20
>>> >> significance
>>> >> of
>>> >> > >> the addition of 'mono-'.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> In the case of 3, why is Bill implicitly
differentiating 'loo=
k
>>> >> at' and
>>> >> > >> 'look
>>> >> > >> after'? I ask this because I am
assuming that he is not >>=20
>>> > >> claiming
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > that
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> 'look at' is a monotransitive prepositional
verb. In the=20
>>> case of
>>> >> ESL,
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > I
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> think it preferable to consider them both
intransitive in ord=
er
>>> >> not to
>>> >> > >> muddy the transitive waters too much.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> 6 & 7 are also problematic in ESL terms
for the same reason b=
ut
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > perhaps
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> we can come to those later.
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Ron Sheen
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please
visit the list's=20
>>> web
>>> >> > >> interface at:
>>> >> > >> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
>>> >> > >> and select "Join or leave the
list"
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please
visit the list's=20
>>> web
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > > interface at:
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
>>> >> > >> and select "Join or leave the
list"
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please
visit the list's w=
eb
>>> >> > > interface at:
>>> >> > > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
>>> >> > > and select "Join or leave the list"
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please
visit the list's w=
eb
>>> >> > interface at:
>>> >> > > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html
>>> >> > > and select "Join or leave the list"
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > >
>>> >> >
>>> >> > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit
the list's web
>>> >> > interface at:
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>>> >> > and select "Join or leave the list"
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/
>>> >> >
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>>
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