My apologies for not seeing that Edmond had sent this to the whole list and that I was not replying to him alone. I especially feel bad about the comment that Bob "feels threatened" by contrary thinking, very much out of line and not at all intended for a wider audience. I have no business speculating on his internal state and stating that as if it were a fact. I also don't believe offering an article as rich and relevant as this is at all self-promoting. I hope that doesn't distract from a rich and interesting thread. I certainly hope a generative perspective can be part of it. Craig > Edmond, > I got about half way through before deciding I had better save the rest > for later and no doubt read a few times--very rich and interesting, > and, so far at least, highly compatible with the direction of my own > thinking. > Bob is arguing out of a generative perspective (at a time in which many > are jumping that ship.)He feels threatened by contrary thinking. > I'm happy to see you quoting Tomasello. "Joint attentional state" is > very useful and can be extended as a pedagogical (mentoring) metaphor. > If I remember right, he uses "intention reading" and "pattern finding" > as important cognitive processes. > If you take an evolutionary view of language, then it is still very > much in flux, evolving in some ways out of the pressure of written > text. Flexibilty as you describe it carries over into this very new (in > evolutionary terms) context. > Thanks much for passing this on. I'm wrestling with an overdue article > and resisting distractions, but this one will get through the filters. > Would it be OK to pass this on to the list? If it comes through me, it > may seem less self-promoting. But it will win over its thoughtful > readers regardless. > > Craig > > >>> Craig, >> >> I am someone who is now arguing that every communicative utterance >> partakes >> of the ambiguity of metaphor. As relevant to the issue of how much >> 'sharing' of understanding goes on, you might be interested in my >> account >> of >> the origin of language, which contains as an essential element of the >> theory, the proposal that no speaker can ever share a perfect >> understanding >> with a hearer, which entails that no word can ever match thought >> precisely. >> My idea derives from the definition the anthropologist Gregory Bateson >> gives >> of play. >> >> See the website: >> >> http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1401/ >> >> Edmond >> >> >> >> >> Brian, >>> I think that's a very useful clarification. Language and thought can >>> be >>> essentially linked without being identical. >>> I was thinking about the way language allows us to separate a team >>> from >>> its members, a picture from its colors and shapes, music from its notes >>> and rhythms, a road from its path and extent. But it would be hard to >>> turn around and say that the picture isn't somehow formed by its colors >>> and shapes, the music by its notes and rhythms, and so on. (Would >>> context change that? Try putting a picture in a different light.) >>> Some grammars tend to look at language as a formal system. In a >>> purely >>> formal system, with, let's say, machines talking to machines (a >>> computer talking to a computer), ambiguity would be an unexpected >>> problem. How could a computer "misunderstand" another computer? Only >>> metaphorically, by analogy, would that make sense. But when I talk to >>> another person, I expect the words to be interpreted, and I draw on all >>> the shared experience, including the shared context of the statement. >>> There are, in fact, context grounding elements built into the system: >>> determiners, pronouns, finite auxiliaries, including the modals and >>> their adjuncts, and so on. In other words, language is built to >>> facilitate shared human understanding. Much of what it conveys would be >>> irrelevant to a machine. And shared understanding is a hugely difficult >>> process, fraught with perils and pitfalls. (What would a computer make >>> of "peril" and "pitfall"? It has no fear of its own mortality, with the >>> exception of Hal, of course, in 2001. But do we all share that >>> reference?) >>> That doesn't even begin to touch on the problem of deliberate >>> misleading or holding back. If you waterboard me, will my words more >>> closely reveal my thoughts? >>> I think you're right. We can posit a deep link between language and >>> thought without thinking of them as purely identical. It is hard for me >>> to imagine human cognition without a shared human experience of the >>> world. We find our way into that world through language. Our language >>> evolves to make sense of that changing world. >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> Bob Yates said, >>>> >>>>> we discuss such sentences in a student text. If someone wants, I >>>>> will >>>>> discuss it in a further post. >>>> >>>> I'd be interested in reading that post, Bob. >>>> >>>> Meanwhile, can you clarify what you mean by "completely separate"? To >>>> me, >>>> "completely separate" sounds like it means independent, parallel, >>>> without >>>> links, even isolated--as if what we say bears no relation to what we >>>> think. But I'm pretty sure that's not what you mean. Would "linked but >>>> distinct" be an accurate paraphrase of what you have in mind? >>>> >>>> Near the other end of the spectrum, the concept that "language >>>> structures >>>> our thinking" has to be distinguished from "language is identical to >>>> thinking." Perhaps non-human animal thinking exists but is less >>>> structured >>>> or differently structured than the thinking of language users. I >>>> assume >>>> that the structure of my own thinking would change if I could no >>>> longer >>>> form or receive words and sentences in my mind. >>>> >>>> Brian >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: Assembly for the Teaching of English Grammar >>>> [[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Robert Yates [[log in to unmask]] >>>> Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2009 12:45 PM >>>> To: [log in to unmask] >>>> Subject: Re: Metaphors we don't live by >>>> >>>> Colleagues, >>>> >>>> I started my first reply on the metaphor string to suggest that there >>>> is >>>> an alternative view from the one that language ³structures our >>>> thinking.² >>>> I believe that language and thought are completely separate. >>>> >>>> (Actually, this is not a very bizarre idea. Imagine that you lost >>>> your >>>> ability to say anything. Would you say you are incapable of thought? >>>> I >>>> have several cats. They are unable to use language but it is clear >>>> they >>>> ³think.² They know that certain sounds mean they will be fed and they >>>> are learning a quick ³no² means to stop what they are doing.) >>>> >>>> I used the example of syntactic ambiguity to question the claim that >>>> language structures are thinking. If that is the case, then it would >>>> seem whenever we utter an ambiguous sentence, we are having both >>>> thoughts at the same time. I donıt think that is the case. I cited >>>> the >>>> example of a real headline: >>>> >>>> Puberty in girls begins earlier than thought >>>> >>>> I just donıt think the writer of that headline had both meanings in >>>> mind >>>> when that headline was composed. As best as I can tell from the >>>> following by Gregg Heacock, that is the implication of the following: >>>> >>>> "But, in my relating having, doing, and being to the past, present, >>>> and >>>> future and to reality, imagination, and conceptualization is that >>>> grammar encodes deep thought patterns. Teachers who belittle grammar >>>> instruction have little idea of how important this discipline is to >>>> shaping the mind. For language not only translates our thinking, it >>>> structures our thinking." >>>> >>>> ****** >>>> >>>> Craig Hancock is right about how, in normal conversations, we resolve >>>> utterance that are ambiguous by reliance on context. He writes: >>>> >>>> ³I don't see any reason to infer . . . that language and thought are >>>> "separate systems." "She was a lightweight" can mean so many things in >>>> so many contexts. It can be a literal observation about weight or a >>>> metaphoric observation about power or ability. Any sensible theory of >>>> language needs to deal with this.² >>>> >>>> Descriptions of language deal with how particular utterances can be >>>> ambiguous, but NO theory about the grammar of language can figure out >>>> all of the possible contexts for determining the meaning of a >>>> particular >>>> utterance. I think the passage above acknowledges that language must >>>> necessarily be different from thought if context is crucial for >>>> determining what a speaker means. >>>> >>>> Consider the following two exchanges and the ³meaning² of the string >>>> ³Is >>>> the Pope Catholic?² >>>> >>>> Exchange I >>>> A visiting Indian student to her American friend: Is the Pope >>>> Catholic? >>>> >>>> Exchange II >>>> Wife to husband returning home late from work: Would you like a drink? >>>> Husband: Is the Pope Catholic? >>>> >>>> In exchange I, the string ³Is the Pope Catholic² is a real question; >>>> in >>>> exchange II, the string means ³yes.² Craig is right that context >>>> determines these two meanings. That the exact same string of words >>>> can >>>> have two separate meanings seems to me that ³language² and ³thought² >>>> are >>>> very separate systems. Perhaps, he can provide an example that they >>>> must be intimately connected. >>>> >>>> (For the best explanation I know to understand why those meanings are >>>> different, see the work of Sperber and Wilson, Relevance Theory, which >>>> is an elaboration of Paul Griceıs Cooperative Principle.) >>>> >>>> This discussion has implications for how we view our studentsı >>>> writing. >>>> If we find an ambiguous sentence in a student text or a sentence that >>>> makes no sense, do we think the studentıs thought is confused or do we >>>> think the student has not recognized in another context the utterance >>>> has a different meaning? >>>> >>>> This post is long. In a paper by Jim Kenkel and me that will be >>>> appearing in Written Communication in October, we discuss such >>>> sentence >>>> in a student text. If someone wants, I will discuss it in a further >>>> post. >>>> >>>> Bob Yates, University of Central Missouri >>>> >>>> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web >>>> interface >>>> at: >>>> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html >>>> and select "Join or leave the list" >>>> >>>> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/ >>>> >>>> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web >>>> interface >>>> at: >>>> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html >>>> and select "Join or leave the list" >>>> >>>> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/ >>>> >>> >>> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web >>> interface at: >>> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html >>> and select "Join or leave the list" >>> >>> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/ >> >> To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web >> interface >> at: >> http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html >> and select "Join or leave the list" >> >> Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/ >> > > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web interface > at: > http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html > and select "Join or leave the list" > > Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/ > To join or leave this LISTSERV list, please visit the list's web interface at: http://listserv.muohio.edu/archives/ateg.html and select "Join or leave the list" Visit ATEG's web site at http://ateg.org/