This appears too long to send, so I will send in two parts. This is part 1.
Robin,
The following are excerpts from messages I sent you and Ron about two years
ago.
You wrote:
> Well, before he came to NIAAA, Chafetz was a confirmed advocate of the
> idea that the way to prevent alcohol problems in America was to teach all
> Americans to drink like Jews, Italians or Chinese.
> Noble's shift of the slogan to "responsible decisions about drinking"
reflected his conviction that a place had to be made in it for abstention as
a potential responsible decision. Quite apart from any beverage industry
influences, I believe these were genuine differences of conviction.
I agree. I knew them both well and - although I agreed more with Ernie than
with Morrie - I think they were both sincere. I think Morrie had to walk a
thin line as NIAAA director in order to both serve the constituency and avoid
offending his industry friends who - I believe - supported much of his early
work. And his father-in-law, a former President of the Licensed Beverage
Industry.
You wrote:
> The Third Report was actually a debacle: what was intended as the 3rd
> report, it was decided at the last minute somewhere in NIAAA or HEW, was
too long and technical for Congress, and what was intended as the report
became the "technical support document", with what had been intended as a
press kit becoming the actual report to Congress. In our perception, a lot
of concreteness was lost along the way.
My memory of this is that it was a real debacle indeed. The following is
from a document I prepared which was intended to support a chapter in my book
on the role of the alcohol industry. It is lengthy, so if you aren't
interested stop reading here:
On October 17, 1978, Secretary Califano submitted the Third Report to
Congress. The release of the report, dated June 1978, had been long stalled.
Elaborate plans had been laid the previous year for press conferences and
advance distribution of materials to state alcoholism agencies and other
groups in order to obtain the maximum publicity for the report.
The report had a tortured history. It was originally submitted to the HEW
front office the previous fall in the form of a voluminous document several
hundred pages long. NIAAA was told to prepare a more concise summary for
submission to Congress.
The summary report underwent several revisions before being sent to Califano
in the spring of 1978, where it had been hanging fire until its release.
Meanwhile, the longer document, after being reconciled with the final version
of the report, was being published as the "Technical Report in Support of the
Third Special Report on Alcohol and Health."
But no news conference was held, and the report was released without fanfare
two days after Congress adjourned for the elections with a two-page statement
by Califano.
A series of recommendations contained in earlier versions of the report were
omitted with the explanation that HEW was presently actively involved in
developing initiatives in the alcoholism area and Secretary Califano would be
making recommendations for legislative action "at appropriate times during
the coming year.”
In the report's foreword, Califano addressed the role of the alcoholic
beverage industry saying: "It is not an easy task to reduce substantially
the enormous costs to our society caused by alcoholism, but it is one that
all of us must address. The alcoholic beverage industry could make a
substantial contribution by examining its current policies and procedures.
Self-regulation to lessen the potential ill effects of marketing strategies
on youth is one way the industry could evidence its willingness to become
even more responsible. States and local communities should be encouraged to
reexamine their policies regarding alcohol availability as affected by
licensing, age limits, taxes, prices and related influences."
Ernie Noble had been fired prior to the release of the report, but the report
had been written during his directorship of NIAAA and he was listed as its
editor and signed an Introduction, in which he said that:
"It has been assumed in the past that the alcohol beverage industry is not
obligated to inform consumers about the risk side of the drinking equation.
That circumstance is changing. The consumer movement has propelled us into
an era of fair labeling practices and truth in advertising.
"The time has come for a national code of alcohol advertising standards to be
developed in cooperation with the alcohol beverage industry. Advertising
that may exert an undue influence on young people needs to be reexamined.
The special risks that people take when they drink alcohol in conjunction
with other drugs and medications need to be clearly identified to consumers.
Those who re incurring risks when they drink at all need to be so informed.
The safe use of its product is an industry responsibility."
The first two reports had been released when Morris Chafetz had headed NIAAA.
The first report had been unveiled at a news conference in February 1972,
featuring Chafetz, and received front-page coverage in The New York Times and
other dailies.
The second report, Alcohol and Health - New Knowledge, was released in July
1974 at a special briefing for health and science writers under White House
and HEW auspices at the Executive Office building in Washington, with Chafetz
on hand to field questions. It received heavy coverage in most of the major
dailies as well as in the broadcast media. It was followed by a 100-day
"blitz" featuring out-of-town appearances by Chafetz and other top Institute
officials to publicize the report.
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