This appears too long to send, so I will send in two parts.  This is part 1.

Robin,

The following are excerpts from messages I sent you and Ron about two years 
ago.

You wrote:
> Well, before he came to NIAAA, Chafetz was a confirmed advocate of the 
> idea that the way to prevent alcohol problems in America was to teach all 
> Americans to drink like Jews, Italians or Chinese. 

>  Noble's shift of the slogan to "responsible decisions about drinking" 
reflected his conviction that a place had to be made in it for abstention as 
a potential responsible decision.  Quite apart from any beverage industry 
influences, I believe these were genuine differences of conviction.

I agree.  I knew them both well and - although I agreed more with Ernie than 
with Morrie -  I think they were both sincere.  I think Morrie had to walk a 
thin line as NIAAA director in order to both serve the constituency and avoid 
offending his industry friends who - I believe - supported much of his early 
work.  And his father-in-law, a former President of the Licensed Beverage 
Industry.

You wrote:

> The Third Report was actually a debacle: what was intended as the 3rd 
> report, it was decided at the last minute somewhere in NIAAA or HEW, was 
too long and technical for Congress, and what was intended as the report 
became  the "technical support document", with what had been intended as a 
press kit becoming the actual report to Congress.  In our perception, a lot 
of concreteness was lost along the way.

My memory of this is that it was a real debacle indeed.  The following is 
from a document I prepared which was intended to support a chapter in my book 
on the role of the alcohol industry.  It is lengthy, so if you aren't 
interested stop reading here:

On October 17, 1978, Secretary Califano submitted the Third Report to
Congress.  The release of the report, dated June 1978, had been long stalled. 
 Elaborate plans had been laid the previous year for press conferences and 
advance distribution of materials to state alcoholism agencies and other 
groups in order to obtain the maximum publicity for the report.

The report had a tortured history. It was originally submitted to the HEW 
front office the previous fall in the form of a voluminous document several 
hundred pages long.  NIAAA was told to prepare a more concise summary for 
submission to Congress.  

The summary report underwent several revisions before being sent to Califano 
in the spring of 1978, where it had been hanging fire until its release.

Meanwhile, the longer document, after being reconciled with the final version 
of the report, was being published as the "Technical Report in Support of the 
Third Special Report on Alcohol and Health."

But no news conference was held, and the report was released without fanfare 
two days after Congress adjourned for the elections with a two-page statement 
by Califano.

A series of recommendations contained in earlier versions of the report were
omitted with the explanation that HEW was presently actively involved in 
developing initiatives in the alcoholism area and Secretary Califano would be 
making recommendations for legislative action "at appropriate times during 
the coming year.”

In the report's foreword, Califano addressed the role of the alcoholic 
beverage industry saying:  "It is not an easy task to reduce substantially 
the enormous costs to our society caused by alcoholism, but it is one that 
all of us must address.  The alcoholic beverage industry could make a 
substantial contribution by examining its current policies and procedures.  
Self-regulation to lessen the potential ill effects of marketing strategies 
on youth is one way the industry could evidence its willingness to become 
even more responsible.  States and local communities should be encouraged to 
reexamine their policies regarding alcohol availability as affected by 
licensing, age limits, taxes, prices and related influences."

Ernie Noble had been fired prior to the release of the report, but the report 
had been written during his directorship of NIAAA and he was listed as its 
editor and signed an Introduction, in which he said that:

"It has been assumed in the past that the alcohol beverage industry is not 
obligated to inform consumers about the risk side of the drinking equation.  
That circumstance is changing.  The consumer movement has propelled us into 
an era of fair labeling practices and truth in advertising.

"The time has come for a national code of alcohol advertising standards to be 
developed in cooperation with the alcohol beverage industry.  Advertising 
that may exert an undue influence on young people needs to be reexamined.  
The special risks that people take when they drink alcohol in conjunction 
with other drugs and medications need to be clearly identified to consumers.  
Those who re incurring risks when they drink at all need to be so informed.  
The safe use of its product is an industry responsibility."

The first two reports had been released when Morris Chafetz had headed NIAAA. 

The first report had been unveiled at a news conference in February 1972, 
featuring Chafetz, and received front-page coverage in The New York Times and 
other dailies. 

The second report, Alcohol and Health - New Knowledge, was released in July 
1974 at a special briefing for health and science writers under White House 
and HEW auspices at the Executive Office building in Washington, with Chafetz 
on hand to field questions.  It received heavy coverage in most of the major 
dailies as well as in the broadcast media.  It was followed by a 100-day 
"blitz" featuring out-of-town appearances by Chafetz and other top Institute 
officials to publicize the report.