In the usual context in which a term like capital punishment is used,
murder is a legal term with a definition that varies from one jurisdiction
to another but does not include killings by the government carried out
under the category of capital punishment. You can, of course, use murder as
a rhetorical term; it just won't get you very far in the legal system.
Bill
>I suppose we could pursue the matter, couldn't we? If value judgments are
>called for, I would certainly insist that capital punishment is murder indeed
>and that no equivocation has taken place at all here. It is certainly not
>warranted to assert that capital punishment is NOT murder, any more than that
>it is murder; in fact, it is or is not right in the framework of some
>values-oriented theory. I suppose one must provide a context for the argument
>that the writers offer as an example here. There is really nothing in and of
>itself wrong with what is being asserted. The major premiss identifies a
>category; the minor premiss places something into that category, and the
>conclusion asserts that the property of the category is also shared by a
>subgroup of the category. That's standard Barbara in the first figure: All
>instances where one murders are instances where one commits a wrong act.
>Capital punishment is an instance where one murders. Thus: Capital punishment
>is an instance where one commits a wrong act. That's the same as the All
>humans are mortals; Socrates is a human; thus, Socrates is a mortal. I cannot
>see this as an error unless I fault it for the fallacy of four terms, i.e.
>equivocation on "murder." I think your analysis is in this direction; we may
>simply talk different terminology, suppose?
>
>==Cheers, Reinhold
>
>
>"William J. McCleary" wrote:
>
>> I see it as an example of begging the question because it avoids the issue
>> of defining murder. It assumes that capital punishment is murder, which of
>> course it is not. It is only called murder in order to prejudice the case
>> against capital punishment without addressing the real issues.
>>
>> Bill McCleary
>>
>> >Hmmmm. Strange that they would classify this as an instance of begging
>> >the question. This seems to me to be a perfectly proper argument, which
>> >one might attack better, perhaps, as an instance of equivocation on
>> >"murdering," one meaning as "taking life" and another as "wrongfully
>> >taking life (as defined by law)." This would be question begging if I
>> >were to reason: "Capital punishment is wrong because the state's killing
>> >someone cannot possibly be thought of as right." In this case, the
>> >identical statement is being repeated. Nothing has been backed with
>> >evidence. I'm "begging" that the statement be accepted without evidence.
>> >
>> >==Reinhold
>> >
>> >"Aaron D. Profitt" wrote:
>> >
>> >> It seems to me that "begging the question" comes from logic/argument,
>> >> and means answer a question (ie, challenge) in a way that leaves the
>> >> question unanswered, often because the supposed answer presupposes a
>> >> certain answer to the given question. To quote from my reason and
>> >> argument text (_Understanding Arguments_ by Robert Fogelin and Walter
>> >> Sinnott-Armstrong), "An argument is question begging if it relies,
>> >> either explicity or implicitly, on things that, in the argumentative
>> >> context, are matters of dispute" (p. 350). Their example is:
>> >> (Premise 1) It's always wrong to murder human beings.
>> >> (P2) Capital punishment involves murdering human beings.
>> >> -----------------------------------------
>> >> (Conclusion) Capital punishment is wrong.
>> >>
>> >> The problem, of course, is that P2 presupposes the validity of the
>> >> conclusion.
>> >>
>> >> Aaron D. Profitt
>> >> --
>> >> Aaron D. Profitt
>> >> The Gentle Misanthrope
>> >> "The superfluous, a very necessary thing." - Voltaire
>> >> ~veritas omnia vincit~
>> >> University of Kansas
>>
>> William J. McCleary
>> 3247 Bronson Hill Road
>> Livonia, NY 14487
>> 716-346-6859
William J. McCleary
3247 Bronson Hill Road
Livonia, NY 14487
716-346-6859
|
