There was Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 440 
(D.D.C. 1992), but the 1998 amendments go even further.  In its current 
form, the FCPA purports to reach foreigners who have virtually any sort 
of contact with the United States in furtherance of a violation of the 
act and U.S. nationals who do anything in furtherance of such a 
violation anywhere in the world.  But don't you think this raises some 
due process problems, such as minimum contacts (International Shoe Co. 
v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewick, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)) and reasonable anticipation of 
being haled into court in the U.S. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))?  Article 5 of the OECD Convention 
might help a little as to absent nationals, but not absent non-nationals.

As to the practicalities of physical control over the defendants, 
however, the government can just hire some Mexicans to kidnap them and 
bring them back as far as El Paso.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 
2739, 2761-62 (2004).

Peter W. Schroth



Robert Bird wrote:

>A student asked me a question in class about the FCPA which I cannot
>definitively answer.
>
>The FCPA applies to U.S. companies bribing abroad and an amendment
>extends the FCPA to Non-U.S. citizens acting in the United States.  Is a
>foreign agent (say, a Mexican national) who bribes a Mexican official on
>behalf of a U.S. firm in Mexico liabile under the FCPA?  Assume that the
>Mexican national never enters the United States.  Also, would there be a
>jurisdictional problem with prosecuting the Mexican agent?
>
>Thanks in advance for you help,
>
>Robert
>
>Robert C. Bird
>Assistant Professor
>University of Connecticut
>
>
>  
>