Richard and List:
Just as I was troubled during my own career at NARA by the though of
representing deletions requested by Nixon as independent archival
withdrawals, so too am I troubled by what news stories suggest about
the NARA AF MOU. We have yet to hear a good explanation from NARA
about the reclassification matter. Who knows how much NARA will be
able to tell the public.
In the Nixon case, no one argued that Nixon did not have a right to ask
NARA to withhold information pending a determination by the
Presidential Materials Review Board. Nixon and now his estate had
every right to disagree with archival decisions on what to release from
White House records. But, in my view (shared by almost all of my
1989-era staff level colleagues), any such disagreement had to be
handled srupulouosly, through regulatory channels, in order to protect
the overall credibility of NARA's archival screening efforts. I
actually said to a colleague then and later testified under oath about
my comment that "we weren't serving the former President very well" by
considering agency actions that would raise questions about the
handling of tapes dealing with the Watergate coverup.
(I like what my current boss, Comptroller General David M. Walker, said
in a speech last year about other issues, unrelated to what I'm
describing here: "We need leaders who have the integrity to lead by
example and to practice what they preach, leaders who recognize that
the law is the floor of acceptable conduct and who strive to meet a
higher standard.")
The same is true with declassification/reclassification. I can see how
outside agencies (which, as was Nixon, are parties with a vested
interest in records they created or have equities in) might view
declassification issues differently than NARA. Bruce Craig raises a
good question in his newsletter:
"This raises the issue: why in the first place did the parties to the
agreement believe it a necessity to keep the re_review "secret."
There are other very public re-reviews being conducted by such agencies
as the
Department of Energy that is carrying out the Congressionally mandated
Kyle-Lott review of inadvertent releases relating to nuclear energy and
weapons programs."
It's unclear to me why the reported NARA effort by AF et al. was not
handled more transparently (simply in terms of admitting to its
existence and providing unclassified details of procedures or
protocols), or at least more like the DOE effort. After all, it's not
like any researcher could compel NARA or an agency with equities to
release something that should not have been released. The power, and
therefore the necessary trust, lies in the hands of those holding the
records, not those clamoring for there release. Given the nature of
the effort described in the MOU, I see NARA really being in a bind
here. No matter what it says, people are going to ask, well, what else
has been concealed. That's sad for me to see. I can't imagine the
pressure it must have faced in order to go along with this.
Richard, what would you suggest SAA do in this matter? I tend to agree
that it should issue a statement, but it needs to be carefully crafted.
I know back in 1992-1993, as the Nixon case unfolded, I kept looking
for SAA to comment. However, as I read through the court pleadings and
deposition transcripts, I came to recognize that not all the NARA
players were on the same page. Some of what I saw in the early court
filings surprised me. People such as John Fawcett and Nancy Smith
helped prepare the initial, July 1992 responses to interrogatories and
document production requests in Kutler v. Wilson. They never consulted
with veteran former Nixon Project staff, such as Fred Graboske or me.
John Fawcett was one of the first NARA officials to testify in the
Nixon tapes case. Fred Graboske and I testified later, in August and
September 1992, recounting the 1989 meeting among Fawcett and Nixon
Project archivists. (Fred wasn't there but testified about how he
discussed the meeting with me and with Paul Schmidt right after it
occurred.) I don't know of anyone from SAA who went to the courthouse
in 1992 or 1993 to read through all the stuff I read there, although I
suppose they could have done so. Absent an effort to learn what was
said under oath, any SAA reaction to the Nixon problems would have been
based on second-hand accounts. And SAA hardly was in a position to
start picking and choosing among varying positions voiced by NARA
employees. Absent an attempt to get into the nitty gritty of the
issues buried in the court filings, which would have been complicated
but would have served NARA well, all SAA then could do was issue
general statements.
Maarja
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Cox <[log in to unmask]>
To: [log in to unmask]
Sent: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 15:35:48 +0000
Subject: nara and reclassification
Below is another view into the Nara and reclassification case, and this
view
suggests a serious breach of professional ethics (in my opinion). I do
not
believe SAA has issued a statement/position on the reclassification,
and I urge
members of SAA to communicate with SAA leadership to look into this
case and
take a position.
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