Everyone:
 
Today's Chronicle of Higher Education has an article that states that
NARA has agreed to stop letting agencies secretly withdraw documents. 
Is this sufficient?  I'm only stating the article's topic, because we
were recently informed that you need permission from the Chronicle to
post their articles to discussion groups.  I have requested permission
to post this article, but just in case those who have access you can
read it now.  Here is the statement:
 
Permission is required to post Chronicle articles, or the contents of
Chronicle e-mail reports, on Web sites, newsgroups, or electronic
mailing lists (either restricted or general). 
 
Rebecca

>>> <[log in to unmask]> 4/19/2006 6:52:14 AM >>>

Richard Cox writes, "While there is much that is good in the SAA
statement on
the NARA reclassification case, I am concerned about a few elements of
this
statement."  As is Richard, I am puzzled by why the SAA statement on
the NARA
reclassification issue is so limited in focus.   He correctly points to
the
premature quality of some of the wording, at a time when NARA's own
internal
review of the reclassification matter still is ongoing.  One can
congratulate NARA
for undertaking a review; however, no one knows yet what the short and
long
term outcome will be.

This is a difficult challenge for the agency.  I tend to agree with
Dr.
Weinstein that while I myself wouldn't have accepted some aspects of
the
agreements, such the requirement to conceal the existence of re-review
from the public,
the classified MOUs probably were signed with good intentions.  Given
the
complexity of the issues, there is not way to tell how NARA will handle
this
ultimately.  If NARA ends up punting on the matter, as it has on some
other issues
in the past, some of the wording in the SAA statement will appear
hollow.

I recognize that issues relating to NARA and especially to security
classification can be difficult to unravel.  Perhaps that explains the
curious silence
on this List.  (Remember also that many List subscribers work at NARA. 
While
they follow with interest what we write here, they probably do not find
it
safe to post here on this issue.) Of course, I suppose a few List
members may
conflate their personal political views with attempts to examine
governmental
issues, no matter how objectively and in a neutral fashion, and simply
tune out
any stories about controversies involving executive branch agencies. 
Others
may not think about the fact that just as the theft of an artist's
subject file
or the removal of a map from the research room by a French woman
represent
ethical challenges, so does the way NARA reacts to pressure or input
from
external stakeholders.

In an earlier posting about SAA last year, I asked you all to think
about
contentious issues within your own organizations.  How easy would it be
for SAA
to find out about them and to provide public support for you?)  
Perhaps that
is one reason why the SAA statement falls short.  Still, one would
think we
could do more (Richard correctly points to the offer of forums, etc.,
as options
that could have been mentioned.)

Coincidentally, on the same day that SAA issued its statement, Maurita
Baldock linked us to an interesting article in the Chronicle of Higher
Education
about FBI efforts to examine Jack Anderson's archival collection.  The
NYT and
WaPo picked up the story today.  Scott Shane notes in today's New York
Times
that "'Recovery of leaked C.I.A. and White House documents that Jack
Anderson got
back in the 70's has been on the F.B.I.'s wanted list for decades,'
Mr.
Blanton said."

The leaking of security classified records by government employees is
wrong -
period.  But we should consider the fact that if the government misuses
its
classification authority, or overclassifies information, the likelihood
of
leaks likely will increase.  Unfortunately, human nature being what it
is, we are
more likely to read about the government's attempts to reclaim
documents that
a Jack Anderson might hold than about admonitions to use
classification
authority properly.  Or for government officials to act ethically and
with
integrity in difficult situations, thereby avoiding altogether the
temptation to ask
others to cover up actions by improperly stamping something secret.

There are people involved in every step of the way in creating and
handling
records.  They can be the weakest or the strongest links in the
process.
Whatever is in them, ultimately, government records end up at the
National
Archives.  That's the final stop for records of national memory.  If
NARA can't
properly handle them, then we all are in real trouble.

Consider what Bill Leonard said about some of this in a speech in 2004
(yes,
that's the same Bill Leonard who is the director of NARA's ISOO unit,
the man
now in charge of the internal review of the reclassification issue):

". . . like all authority, classification authority is not without
limits.
There are some very clear prohibitions with respect to the use of
classification. Specifically, in no case can information be classified
in order to conceal
violations of law or to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization
or
agency. Nonetheless, you are all probably aware of certain information
dealing
with the abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison that has apparently
been
classified. The Department of Defense is currently in the process of
addressing a
number of concerns I have raised with them in this regard and I await
their
formal reply.  . . .

And what is gained by classifying such activity? Our values as a
society are
such that they will invariably serve as a self-correcting measure when
confronted with such abuses - thus the inevitability that such
information will
eventually become widely known. At the same time, the initial act of
classification
can negatively impact the timeliness and completeness of notifications
provided to certain Government officials, thus impairing their ability
to deal with
ensuing issues. In the final analysis, we only succeed in keeping the
information from those who need to know it the most - the American
people and their
leaders - and even then, we only delay the inevitable."

He also noted that

". . . as evidenced by a review of newspaper headlines over the past
several
months, agencies are finding it is increasingly difficult for them to
hold
their cleared employees accountable for adhering to the requirements
for
protecting classified information unless they likewise adhere to their
provisions. . .
. Added to the above is my experience that many senior officials will
candidly acknowledge that the Government classifies too much
information, although
oftentimes the observation is made with respect to the activities of
agencies
other than their own. . . . I believe that it is no coincidence that
some of
these same agencies are currently experiencing a veritable epidemic of
leaks -
part and parcel of what occurs when individuals begin to loose
confidence in the
security classification system."

SOURCE:  William Leonard, "The Importance of Basics," June 15, 2004,
at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/speeches-and-articles/ncms-2004.html

To read Bill Leonard's bio, see
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/about/director.html .  I do not know him,
have never met him, but know several people who now
work for or have worked for him recently.  In fact, my late sister,
Eva,
trained and was a mentor to several such employees.

Until NARA finishes its review, we will not know how much our longterm
confidence in the agency should be affected.  As does Richard, I wish
SAA's
statement would have been more nuanced and had reflected greater
contextual
sophistication.  I give SAA credit for putting something out relatively
quickly, and
hitting some of the important points, but hope yesterday's release does
not
represent its final word on these complex issues.

Maarja (former NARA Nixon tapes archivist, 1976-1990)

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A posting from the Archives & Archivists LISTSERV List sponsored by the Society of American Archivists, www.archivists.org.
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