http://www.calyx.com/~mariolap/debate/craig2.html My software can provide only part of this document. The URL for the web site appears above. > [Image] > > as published in: > > [Image] > > Craig Reinarman/Harry G. Levine > > THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S CRACK CRISIS > > "America discovered crack and overdosed on oratory." New York Times > Editorial (10/4/88)1 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > In the Spring of 1986 American politicians and news media embarked > upon an extraordinary anti-drug frenzy. Newspapers, magazines, and > television networks regularly carried lurid stories alleging that an > "epidemic" or "plague" of drug use, crack cocaine in particular, was > literally destroying American society. Politicians from both parties > made increasingly strident calls for a "War on Drugs" and even > challenged each other to take urine tests to provide chemical proof > of their moral purity and fitness for high office. However serious > America's drug problems are, we suggest that the period from 1986 > through 1992 was characterized by a high level of anti drug > hysteria. We do not use the term "hysteria" as hyperbole. In this > period the passions engendered by the fear of drugs lead to > anti-drug extremism. > > We use the term "drug scare" to designate periods when anti drug > crusades have achieved great prominence and legitimacy. Drugs scares > are phenomena in their own right quite apart from drug use and drug > problems. 2 Drug scares have recurred throughout American history > independent of actual increases in drug use or drug problems. During > "red scares," like the McCarthy period in the 1950s, leftists were > said to be seriously threatening to destroy the American way of > life. Similarly, during drug scares all kinds of social problems > have been blamed on one chemical substance or another. Dominant > elite's have typically linked a scape-goated drug with a subordinate > group they perceive as a threat - working-class immigrants, racial > or ethnic minorities, rebellious youth. This latest drug scare - the > "crack scare" - tied cocaine, especially its derivative "crack," > with inner-city African-American and Latino young people. > > The crack scare that began in 1986 waned somewhat in the > non-election year of 1987. But in 1988 drugs returned to the > national stage as stories about the "crack epidemic" again appeared > regularly on front pages and TV screens (Reeves and Campbell, 1994). > One politician after another re-enlisted in the War on Drugs. In > that election year, as in 1986, overwhelming majorities of both > houses of Congress voted for new anti-drug laws with long mandatory > prison terms, death sentences, and large increases in funding for > police and prisons. This started a surge in the annual federal > budget for antidrug efforts from less than $ 2 billion in 1981 to > more than $ 12 billion in 1993. The Bush administration alone spent > $45 billion - more than all other Presidents since Nixon combined - > mostly for law enforcement (Office of National Drug Control Policy, > 1992; Horgan, 1993). The budget for the Drug Enforcement > Administration (DEA) quadrupled between 1981 and 1992 (Massing, > 1993).3 > > The drug war continued throughout 1989 and heated up again in the > Fall when another major new federal anti-drug bill to further > increase drug war funding (S-1233) began winding its way through > Congress. In September President Bush's "Drug Czar," William > Bennett, unveiled his comprehensive battle plan, the National Drug > Control Strategy. His Introduction asks, "What ... accounts for the > intensifying drug-related chaos that we see every day in our > newspapers and on television? One word explains much of it That word > is crack.... Crack is responsible for the fact that vast patches of > the American urban landscape are rapidly deteriorating" (The White > House, 1989, p. 3; original emphasis). The plan proposed yet another > S 2.2 billion increase in drug war spending, 70% of which was to be > allocated to police and prisons, a percentage unchanged since the > Nixon administration (New York Times, 9/6/89, Al l). This new > funding would be used to nearly double prison capacity so that even > casual users as well as dealers could be incarcerated. The plan also > proposed the sale of drug war bonds (reminiscent of World War II) as > a means of financing the $7.9 billion first-year costs. > > On September 5, 1989, President Bush himself announced this plan for > achieving "victory over drugs" in a major prime-time address to the > nation, broadcast on all three national television networks. We want > to focus on this incident as an example of way politicians and the > media systematically misinformed and deceived the public in order to > promote the War on Drugs. According to the New York Times (9/6/89, > p. A1), Bush had returned to Washington early from summer vacation > at his estate on the Maine coast to rehearse with his media > advisers. He spoke to the TV cameras from the presidential desk in > the Oval Office. During the address Bush used what the Times termed > "a dramatic device" - holding up to the cameras a clear plastic bag > of crack labeled "EVIDENCE. " He announced that it was "seized a few > days ago in a park across the street from the White House" > (Washington Post, 9/22//89, p. A1). It's contents, Bush said, were > "turning our cities into battle zones and murdering our children." > The President proclaimed that because of crack and other drugs he > would "more than double Federal assistance to state and local law > enforcement (New York Times, 916189, All). The next morning, the > picture of the President holding a large bag of crack was on the > front pages of newspapers across America. > > On September 22, 1989, the Washington Post, and then National Public > Radio and other newspapers, broke the story of how the President of > the United States had obtained his bag of crack. According to White > House and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials, "the idea of the > President holding up crack was first included in some drafts" of his > speech. Bush enthusiastically approved. A White House Aid told the > Post that the President "liked the prop....It. drove the point home. > " Bush and his advisors also decided that the crack should be seized > in Lafayette Park across from the White House, or somewhere else > nearby, so that the President could say that crack had become so > pervasive that men were "selling drugs in front of the White House " > (Isikoff, 1989, A1). > > This decision set up a complex chain of events. White House > communications director David Demarst asked Cabinet affairs > secretary David Bates to instruct the Justice Department "to find > some crack that fit the description in the speech. " Bates called > Richard Weatherbee, a special assistant to Attorney General Dick > Thornburghy. Weatherbee in turn called James Millford, the executive > assistant to the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Finally, he > phoned William McMullen, the special agent in charge of the DEA's > Washington Office, and told him to arrange an undercover crack buy > near the White House because "evidently, the President wants to show > it could be bought anywhere" (Isikoff, 1989, A1). > > Despite their best efforts, the top Federal drug agents were not > been able to find anyone selling crack (or any other drug) either in > Lafayette Park, or anywhere else in the vicinity of the White House. > Therefore, in order to carry out their assignment, DEA agents had to > entice someone to come to the Park to make the sale. Apparently, the > only person the DEA could convince was Keith Jackson, an 18 year-old > African-American high school senior. McMullan reported that it was > difficult to do because Jackson "did not even know where the White > House was." The DEA's secret tape recording of the conversation > revealed that the teenager seemed baffled by the request: "Where the > [expletive deleted] is the White House?" he asked. Therefore, > McMullan told the Post, "we had to manipulate him to get him down > there. It wasn't easy" (Isikoff, 1989, A1). > > After it was reported that the U.S. government had lured someone to > come to the White House to sell crack, National Public Radio's All > Things Considered news show interviewed men from Washington D.C. > then in prison on drug-selling charges. All agreed that, of course, > nobody would sell crack in Layafette Park because, among other > reasons, there would be no customers. The crack-using population was > in Washington's impoverished neighborhoods some distance from the > White House. Finally, The Washington Post and other papers reported > that the undercover Drug Enforcement Agents had not, after all, > actually seized the crack, as Bush had claimed in his speech. > Rather, the DEA agents had purchased it from Jackson for $2,400 > dollars and then had let him go.4 > > This entire incident is a perfect example of the way in which what > we call a "drug scare" distorts and perverts public knowledge and > policy. The idea of claiming that crack was threatening every > neighborhood in America first appeared in the minds and speech > drafts of Bush's advisers. Then, when they found that reality did > not match the script, a series of high-level officials instructed > federal drug agents to create a reality that would fit the script. > Finally the President of the United States displayed the procured > prop on national TV, announced its "seizure" as a victory, and > suggested to the citizenry that the wholly manufactured event was > typical and common. In the end, when all of this was revealed, none > of it seem to cause politicians or the media to question either the > President's policies or his claims about crack's persuasiveness. > > As a result of Bush's performance, and of all the other drug war > publicity and propaganda, in 1988 and 1989 the drug war commanded > more public attention than any other issue. And the media and > political anti-drug crusade succeeded in making many Americans even > more fearful of crack and other illicit drugs. A New York Times/CBS > News Poll has periodically asked Americans to identify "the most > important problem facing this country today." In January, 1985, 23 > percent answered war or nuclear war; less than 1 percent believed > the most important problem was drugs. In September 1989, shortly > after the President's speech and the blizzard of media stories about > drugs which followed, 64 percent of those polled believed that drugs > were now the most important problem and only 1 percent thought that > war or nuclear war was most important. Even the New York Times > declared in a lead editorial that this reversal was "incredible" and > gently suggested that problems like war, "homelessness and the need > to give poor children a chance in life" should perhaps be given more > attention (9128189, A26). A year later during a lull in anti drug > speeches and coverage, the percentage citing "drugs" as the nation's > top problem had dropped to 10%. Noting this "precipitous fall from a > remarkable height," the Times noted that "the alliance of Presidents > and news directors" shaped public opinion about drugs. Indeed, once > the White House let it be known that the President would be giving a > prime-time address on the subject, all three networks tripled their > coverage of drugs in the two weeks prior to his speech and > quadrupled it for a week afterward (New York Times, 916190, A11). > And, as we will show in the next section, all this occurred as > nearly every index of drug use had been dropping. > > The crack scare continued in 1990 and 1991, although with somewhat > less media and political attention. By the beginning of 1992 - in > the last year of the Bush administration - the War on Drugs in > general, and the crack scare in particular, had begun to decline > significantly in prominence and importance. However, even as the > drug war was receiving less notice from politicians and the media, > it remained institutionalized, bureaucratically powerful, and > extremely well funded (especially police, military, and > education/propaganda activities). > > In this chapter we first briefly review the birth and spread of > crack in the mid 1980s. We trace the media coverage of "the crisis" > and summarize the core claims made about the destructiveness of the > cocaine and crack "plague." Second, we contrast these claims with > the primary U.S. government data on which they were purportedly > based. We show that a gap existed between the official statistical > evidence 5 and the prevalence claims of the media and politicians. > We maintain that the media and politicians misrepresented or ignored > the evidence and instead provided propaganda for the drug war. > Further, we suggest that all of the attention and hype - the crack > scare - raced well ahead of both crack use and problems related to > it. The crack scare, in other words, was not merely a rational > response to a new threat to public health and public order. It > possessed its own causes and logic. By analyzing the scare on its > own terms, we do not wish to deny the fact that crack use had > terrible medical, psychological, social, and economic consequences > on some users and in some inner-city neighborhoods. Rather, our > ultimate focus in this chapter is on why, from 1986 to 1992, so much > attention was given to drugs and why so many claims about drugs - > exaggerated or not - achieved such prominence.6 > > Third, to lay the groundwork for exploring this question we review > the history of drug scares in America We note the way political > elite's, moral entrepreneurs, and sometimes social movements have > linked drug use with subordinate groups, and have blamed a variety > of long-standing social problems on a drug and a group of alleged > users (see, e.g., Szasz, 1974; Helmer, 1975). We suggest that much > the same process of scape-goating has been at work in this drug > scare: crack has become central to public discourse about many > social problems which existed decades before crack appeared, and > which have continued unabated since crack has declined in prominence > as a public issue. > > Finally, we return to the historically-specific social and political > context of this drug scare to show the political utility of the drug > issue - for Democrats as well as Republicans - in a conservative > political context. Politicians and the media, we suggest, have > promoted the drug scare for political and economic purposes only > remotely related to drug problems. We conclude by suggesting some of > the problematic consequences of this drug scare, especially: 1) that > the demonization of one drug diverts attention and resources from > more fundamental problems underlying crack and other drug use; and > 2) that the scare ran the risk of raising curiosity about crack and > investing it with an allure that may have increased the actual use > of crack. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Cocaine and Crack in the Public Eye > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > The use of cocaine in powdered form by affluent people in music, > film, and sports had been common since the 1970s. According to > surveys by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), by 1985 more > than 22 million Americans in all social classes and occupations had > reported at least trying cocaine. Cocaine smoking originated with > "freebasing," which was already increasing by the late 1970s (see > Siegle, 1982; Inciardi 1987). Then (as now) most cocaine users > bought cocaine hydrochloride (powder) for intranasal use (snorting). > But by the end of the 1970s some users had begun to "cook" powder > cocaine down to crystalline or "base" form for smoking. All phases > of this form of cocaine use, from selling to smoking, tended to take > place in the privacy of homes and offices of middle-class or > well-to-do users. They typically purchased cocaine in units of a > gram or more costing $80 to $100 a gram. These relatively affluent > "basers" had been discovering the dangers of smoking cocaine for > several years before the term "crack" was coined. But most such > users had a stake in conventional life; they had valuable things to > lose if they got into trouble with cocaine, and they also had the > incentives and the resources to cut down, quit, get private > treatment, or otherwise control and conceal their use. > > The orgy of media and political attention did not begin in the late > 1970s when the prevalence of cocaine use jumped sharply, or even > after middle- class and upper-class users began to experience > trouble, especially with freebasing. Rather, the scare began when > smokable cocaine, in the form of crack, made its appearance in a few > poor urban neighborhoods. Like basers, crack users found that this > mode of ingesting cocaine produced a much more intense and far > shorter "high" because it delivered more pure cocaine into the brain > far more directly and rapidly than by snorting. Many crack users > found that crack's intense, brutally brief "orgasmic rush," combined > with the painful "low" or "down" which immediately followed, > produced a powerful desire to immediately repeat use - to binge (see > Waldorf, Reinarman, and Murphy, 1991). This pattern of an immediate, > intense, and brief high followed quickly by painful low is the > pharmacological source of the short-term bingeing that is > characteristic of much crack use (Morgan and Zimmer, forthcoming). > However, crack's pharmacological power alone does not explain the > attention it received. > > Politicians and the media focused on crack not because the cocaine > was ingested in a more direct, dangerous manner. Cocaine freebase, > the precursor of crack, had been smoked in the late 1970s and early > 1980s, and the problems of freebasers were well known. But these > people tended to be white and middle-class or affluent. At this > point in history, the only movement in drug policy seemed to be the > proliferation of for-profit treatment programs. Crack, on the other > hand, attracted the attention of politicians and the media because > of its downward mobility to and increased visibility in ghettos and > barrios. The new users had a different social class, race, and > status (see Duster, 1970; Washton and Gold, 1987). Crack was sold in > smaller, cheaper, precooked units, on ghetto streets, to poorer, > younger buyers who were already seen as a threat (e.g., New York > Times, Aug. 30, 1987; Newsweek, Nov. 23, 1987; Boston Globe, May 18, > 1988). Crack spread cocaine smoking into poor populations already > beset with a cornucopia of troubles (see Wilson, 1987). These people > tended to have fewer bonds to conventional society, less to lose, > and far fewer resources to cope with or shield themselves from > drug-related problems. > > Thus, the latest drug scare began in earnest when crack use became > visible among this "dangerous" group. The earliest mass media > reference to the new form of cocaine may have been a Los Angeles > Times article in late 1984 (11/25/84:cc 1) on the use of cocaine > "rocks" in ghettos and barrios in Los Angeles. By late 1985, the New > York Times made the first specific reference to "crack" in the > national media in a story about three teenagers seeking treatment > for cocaine abuse (ll/17/85:B12). At the start of 1986 crack was > known only in a few impoverished neighborhoods in Los Angeles, New > York, Miami, and perhaps a few other large cities. > > When two celebrity athletes died in what news stories called > "crack-related deaths" in the Spring of 1986, the media seemed to > sense a potential bonanza "Dramatic footage" of black and Latino men > being carted off in chains, or of police breaking down crack house > doors, became a near nightly news event. Coverage skyrocketed and > crack became widely known. In July 1986 alone the three major TV > networks offered 74 evening news segments on drugs, half of these > about crack (Diamond et al., 1987; Reeves and Campbell, 1994). In > the months leading up to the November elections, a handful of > national newspapers and magazines produced roughly 1,000 stories > discussing crack (see Inciardi, 1987:481; Trebach, 1987:6-16). Like > the TV networks, leading news magazines like Time and Newsweek > seemed determined not to be out-done; each devoted five cover > stories to crack and the "drug crisis" in 1986 alone. > > In the fall of 1986, the CBS News show 48 Hours aired a heavily > promoted documentary called "48 Hours on Crack Street" which Dan > Rather previewed on his Evening News show: "Tonight, CBS News takes > you to the streets, to the war zone, for an unusual two hours of > hands-on horror." Among the many shots from hidden cameras was one > of New York Senator Alphonse D'Amato, in cognito, purchasing a vial > of crack in order to dramatize the brazenness of streetcorner sales > in the ghetto. All this was good business for CBS: the program > earned the highest Nielsen rating of any similar news show in the > previous five years - 15 million viewers (Diamond et al., 1987:10). > Three years later, after 48 Hours was nearly killed by poor ratings, > the series kicked off its 1989 season with a 3-hour special, "Return > to Crack Street. > > The intense media competition for audience share and advertising > dollars spawned many similar shows. Three days after "48 Hours on > Crack Street," NBC followed with its own prime-time special, > "Cocaine Country," which asserted that cocaine and crack use had > gone beyond epidemic to become pandemic. This was one of over 400 > separate stories on crack and cocaine produced by NBC alone - an > unprecedented 15 hours of air time - in the seven months leading up > to the 1986 elections (see Diamond et al., 1987; Hoffman, 1987). By > mid-1986, Newsweek claimed that crack was the biggest story since > Vietnam and Watergate (6116186: 15), and Time soon followed by > calling crack "the Issue of the Year" (9122186:25). The words > "plague," "epidemic," and "crisis" had become routine (see > Appendix). The New York Times, for example, did a 3-part, front-page > series called "The Crack Plague" (6124188:A1). > > This media frenzy continued into 1989, with even the nation's best > newspapers joining in. During the 12 months between October 1988 and > October 1989, for example, the Washington Post alone ran 1565 > stories - 28,476 column inches - about the drug crisis. Even Richard > Harwood, the Washington Post's own internal ombudsman editorialized > against what he called the loss of "a proper sense of perspective" > due to such a "hyperbole epidemic." At a time when almost every form > of drug use was declining, Harwood (1989) wrote, "the press and the > politicians are doing a number on people's heads." > > President and Nancy Reagan were only the most prominent of > politicians to join in asserting that drugs, especially crack, were > "tearing our country apart" and "killing ... a whole generation [of] > ... our children" (Time, Sept 22, 1986:25). The latter claim was > repeated as recently as February of 1994 by a prominent New York > Times journalist who wrote that "An entire generation is being > sacrificed to [crack]" (Staples, 1994). In the 1988 presidential > primaries more and more politicians again claimed that crack was > destroying American youth and causing much of the crime, violence, > prostitution, and child abuse in the nation. Democrats and > Republicans, liberals and conservatives alike called repeatedly for > an "all-out War on Drugs." > > An April, 1988 ABC News "Special Report" again termed crack "a > plague" that was "eating away at the fabric of America." This > documentary, like others before and since, made a long series of > provocative claims: that Americans spend "twenty billion a year on > cocaine:" that American businesses lose "sixty billion" dollars a > year in productivity because their workers use drugs; that "the > educational system is being undermined" by student drug use; and > that "the family" was "disintegrating" in the face of this > "epidemic." In 48 minutes of airtime, millions of viewers again were > given a powerful vocabulary of attribution: "drugs," especially > crack, were destroying virtually every institution in American life > - jobs, schools, families, national sovereignty, community, law > enforcement, and business > > From the opening shots in 1986 to this 1988 television show and > President Bush's national address in 1989, and through all the > stories about "crack babies" in 1990 and 1991, crack cocaine was > defined as supremely evil - the most important cause of America's > problems. As in previous drug scares since the l9th-century crusade > against alcohol, one of the core features of drug war discourse was > what we call the routinization of caricature - worst cases framed as > typical cases, the episodic rhetorically recrafted into the > epidemic, and the epidemic into the pandemic. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Official Government Evidence > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > On those rare occasions when politicians and journalists cited any > evidence to support their prevalence claims, they relied on two > basic sources, both funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse > (NIDA). One source was the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), a > monitoring project set up to survey hospitals, crisis and treatment > centers, and coroners across the country about drug-related > emergencies and deaths. The other was NIDA's national surveys on > drug use among general population households and among young people. > Other data sources existed, but these usually were either anecdotal, > specific to a particular location, or based on a skewed sample.7 > Therefore, we will review what these two NIDA data sources had to > say about crack because they were and remain the only national data > and because they were and are considered by experts and > claims-makers the most reliable form of evidence available.8 > > The Drug Abuse Warning Network DAWN collects data on a whole series > of drugs - from amphetamine to aspirin - that are thought to be > present in emergencies or fatalities. This data takes the form of > "mentions." A drug "mention" is produced when a patient, or someone > with a patient, tells attending medical personnel that the patient > recently used the drug, or occasionally if a blood test shows the > presence of the drug. > > These data provided perhaps the only piece of statistical support > for the crack scare. They indicated that cocaine was "mentioned" in > an increasing number of emergency room episodes throughout the > 1980s. During 1986, as the scare moved into full swing, there were > an estimated 51,600 emergency room episodes in which cocaine was > "mentioned" (NIDA, 1993a). In subsequent years the estimated number > of such "mentions" continued to rise, providing clear cause for > concern. By 1989, for example, the estimated number of emergency > room episodes in which cocaine was "mentioned" had more than doubled > to 110,000. Although the estimate dropped sharply in 1990 to 80,400, > by 1992 it had risen again to 119,800 (NIDA, 1993a). > > Unfortunately, the meaning of a "mention" is ambiguous. In many of > these cases the cocaine use was probably incidental. Such episodes > included many cases in which people went to emergency rooms after > being injured in home or auto accidents. Moreover, in most cases, > cocaine was only one of the drugs in the person's system; most > people had also been drinking alcohol. Finally, the DAWN data does > not include information about pre-existing medical or mental health > conditions that make any form of drug use, legal or illegal, more > risky. For all these reasons one can not properly infer direct cause > from the estimates of "emergency room mentions." Cocaine did play a > causal role in some cases, but no one knows how many or what > proportion of the total they were. > > The DAWN data on deaths in which cocaine was "mentioned" by medical > examiners also must be closely examined. When the crack scare got > underway in 1986, coroners coded 1,092 deaths as "cocaine-related" > (NIDA, 1986b), and as crack spread this number, too, increased > substantially. In 1989 the Secretary of Health and Human Services > reported a 20% decline in both deaths and emergency room episodes in > which cocaine was mentioned,9 but both indices rose again in l991 > and 1992. The 1992 DAWN figures showed 3,020 deaths in which cocaine > was "mentioned" (NIDA, 1992). > > But, again, cocaine alone was "mentioned" only in a fraction of > these deaths (e.g., 18.9% in 1986 [NIDA, 1986b]). In most of these > cases cocaine had been used with other drugs, again, most often > alcohol. Although any death is tragic, cocaine's role in such > fatalities remains ambiguous. "Cocaine-related" is not the same as > "cocaine-caused," and "cocaine-related deaths" does not mean "deaths > due to cocaine." There is little doubt that cocaine contributes to > some significant (but unknown) percentage of such deaths, but it is > worth noting that media accoun