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From:
"Bruce D. Despain" <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Assembly for the Teaching of English Grammar <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sun, 27 Aug 2006 14:12:20 -0600
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Paul,
Thanks for the clarification on Bertrand Russell's paradox.  The root of the matter has nothing to do with the interpretation of the sentences, however.  It has to do with defining sets in terms of themselves.  I should have spelled this out better.  This is how some people seem to be treating nouns and verbs.  A noun is a word that designates a person, place, or thing.  It is not a person; it is not a place; it is a word.  The fact that a word is a thing places it in the set of things being defined.  Hence, the paradox. I am not against this definition! As long as we are aware of the self-reference we can use this definition in teaching without any trouble.  

Problems arise when the students live in another universe and want to carry the words too far and use them in ways that are not negotiable.  I realize that the power of poetry is the use of words in unique ways, but then meaning can no longer be wrested from the denotation of the words.  It is constructed in the mind of the reader from connotations, and those very personal.  I allow authors like Ezra Pound to use the language how they find it fulfilling, but must admit that I am not a fan of this kind of enlightenment.  When someone says that a noun is an entity to be observed and analyzed like its own designations and then finally take it as the superclass of all entities, they are engaging in poetry, not science.  

Bruce 
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Paul E. Doniger 
  To: [log in to unmask] 
  Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:22 AM
  Subject: Russel's paradox - sidebar


  Regarding Russel's paradox: Bruce, you paraphrased it such a way that it's not really a paradox: One could simply say the barber doesn't live in the village. Russel put it this way: "In a certain village there is a certain barber who shaves all those who do not shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself?" It's a very complex and interesting paradox that hinges a lot on meaning (semantics?). The easy answers, the barber doesn't shave at all or the barber is female, don't really remove the paradox. The philosophers divide the villagers into "self-shavers" and "clients of the barber." If the barber is a self-shaver, then he isn't a client (and vice versa) and therefore the paradox supposedly evaporates. It's quite convoluted. 

  Paul D.


  ----- Original Message ----
  From: Bruce D. Despain <[log in to unmask]>
  To: [log in to unmask]
  Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 8:37:47 AM
  Subject: Re: Defining Traditional Grammar


  Edmond, Phil, et al.,

  I realize that Jean Atchison is a respected "linguist" but her quote cannot
  be taken literally.  She would have better expressed the situation if she
  had not used the words 'noun' and 'verb' to refer to the concepts that the
  words of their respective classes refer to.  There are levels of reference,
  levels of meaning.  This is the problem that Bertram Russell ran up against
  when he proposed to mathematize concepts with formal logic.  The perplexity
  is called the paradox of the barber: "If a barber shaves everyone in the
  village who does not shave himself, then who shaves the barber?"  The sense
  in which a noun or a verb is an entity cannot be studied at the same level
  as objects of the rest of the real world can be. You will always run up
  against this paradox.  Russell's solution was to propose a theory of types.
  It's not pleasant, but it is the only way to make progress here.  The
  problem arises when we use a natural language to describe a natural
  language.

  So, let me reword Atchinson's quote more precisely as follows:

  'Nouns designate entities at one end of a continuum, with words that refer
  to entities that retain their identity through time, such as dog, mountain,
  sky.  Verbs designate entities at the other end, with
  words that involve rapid change, such as jump, hit, swim.  In the middle
  come expressions to refer to properties, some semi-permanent, as in a large
  elephant, a round pond, a green frog, and some temporary, as in an angry
  bull, a happy baby, a hot day.'

  It is difficult for a scientist to accept that the object of study must be
  taken as blurred into the rest of the world.  To make progress in any
  investigation, there must be an analysis, a separation of the object of
  study (here language) from other phenomena in the real world.  (The English
  teacher must stop this incessant desire to philosophize by abstracting
  everything out of existence.  This is endemic in the English department;
  that has been my experience.)  Linguistics is the study of natural language.
  The study of the concepts that language refers to is part of semantics.  (As
  the saying goes, "that's just semantics.) Our investigations of grammar will
  be more fruitful if the concepts of our study are kept apart from the
  concepts of the world outside that study.  The same principles of
  investigation must govern linguistics as they do the other sciences.
  (English teachers need to realize this about science and the formal
  languages of mathematics.)

  ----- Original Message -----
  From: "Edmond Wright" <[log in to unmask]>
  To: <[log in to unmask]>
  Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 3:44 AM
  Subject: Re: Defining Traditional Grammar


  > One must agree with Phil Bralich on the issue of human selection when it
  comes
  to what in the real we are to call 'entities'.  Take this quotation from
  Jean
  Aitchison's 'The Seeds of Speech' (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,
  1996):

  'Nouns are at one end of a continuum, with words that retain their identity
  through time, such as dog, mountain, sky.  Verbs are at the other end, with
  words that involve rapid change, such as jump, hit, swim.  In the middle
  come properties, some semi-permanent, as in a large elephant, a round pond,
  a green frog, and some temporary, as in an angry bull, a happy baby, a hot
  day.' (p. 132)

  She then shows how languages differ in this regard, pointing out that there
  is an indefinite borderline, as regards what they refer to, between nouns
  and adjectives on the one hand, and verbs and adjectives on the other.  She
  thus goes on to illustrate the point from English:

  'Some adjectives seem more like nouns, as in a gold watch, a tin tray,
  others more like verbs, as in a lasting peace, a whistling kettle.'  (ibid.)

  It is important here is to ask what kind of a Ocontinuum¹ she is referring
  to.  It appears that she just means that there is a gradation of meaning in
  the words themselves so that we could set them out in some kind of ascending
  order from stability to changeableness. But what cannot be left out here is
  the actual continuum, the changeable real, 'matter', the 'hyle' of the
  Greeks, Heracleitos's flow of becoming, whatever you like to call it, upon
  which people are endeavouring to get a mutual fix with their statements to
  each other.  This is a serious engagement with the contingencies of time in
  which we each (if we are not lying) are, according to our own lights,
  hopefully endeavouring to update others.  What we apply these functional
  devices we call Oparts of speech¹ to is a matter of human choice.  The word
  Omatter¹ itself gives away the fact that we are trying to divide up the
  continuum of the real together so that our PURPOSES, our desires and fears,
  will keep in harmony both with the real and with each other across persons.
  So what we apply them to must reflect our immediate and long-term
  preferences, those that our bodies and the society our bodies try to
  maintain out of the real in the hope of success, and not necessarily
  anything already so classified in the real.  Entities, even persons, don't
  come already labelled or as purely 'singular' in the real.  If I may here
  refer to my recent book 'Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith'
  (Macmillan, 2005), you will find there the notion of a singular entity
  exposed to a close analysis (chapters 4 and 5), together with its relation
  to the Statement in use.

  Edmond


  Dr. Edmond Wright
  3 Boathouse Court
  Trafalgar Road
  Cambridge
  CB4 1DU
  England

  Email: [log in to unmask]
  Website: http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~elw33
  Phone [00 44] (0)1223 350256

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